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FINDING COMMON GROUND ACROSS RACE AND RELIGION:
JUDICIAL CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Stuart Chinn*
Abstract
This article opens with a brief discussion of the recent controversies
over race, inclusion, and community on American college campuses,
focusing on the events at Yale University during the 2015 fall semester.
Yale’s controversy is fascinating as one of the most recent, high-profile
events that invites a discussion of a deep and persistent issue in
American society: how do we construct and maintain a stable political
community characterized by enduring differences? I use the Yale
example as my jumping-off point for interrogating this question in the
context of Supreme Court cases on race and public education, and
religion/ideology and public education.
My focus on judicial opinions dealing with public education is
motivated by several considerations: elementary and secondary public
schools, in particular, constitute perhaps the most direct point of contact
between most American children and the state. Thus, these institutions
have the opportunity to shape future participants in the American
political community and to impart the particular values that will help
constitute that community. Relatedly, my focus on judicial conceptions of
political community in the public school context provides the key
attraction of hearing major national political actors discuss these themes
within the illuminating format of principle-based judicial opinions.
Given this, and given the centrality of public education, racial identity,
and religious identity in American society, I am presuming that the
dynamics that these judicial opinions illuminate will illuminate the
dynamics present within other types of communities in America.
In this article, I make three primary claims. First, within the
judicial opinions that grapple with racial and religious/ideological
difference in the context of public education, one might glean a set of
judicial beliefs common to both regarding the adhesive force of public
education in creating and maintaining political community. More
precisely, I will claim that judges have seen public schools as a cultural
adhesive force across both types of plurality. The specific manner in
*
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which public schools bind students together is by virtue of the physical
proximity of students to one another, and their observation in,
participation in, and creation of a common culture.
However, this doctrinal comparison yields a key difference too, and
this constitutes my second claim: in the race and public education
context, the central problem that has appeared in the doctrine—and the
main problem that has animated judicial conceptions of community in
that context—has been the problem of community-creation. Judges have
largely pondered the justifications and limits upon the state’s authority
to create racial plurality in public schools. Such arguments proceed from
background assumptions of minimal racial plurality absent the
contemplated state actions. In contrast, in the religion/ideology and
public education context, the major cases and judicial arguments on
plurality within public schools are preoccupied with the problems of
community-maintenance. Judges have pondered the justifications and
limits upon state actions toward maintaining stable communities in
public schools in the face of individual claims of religious freedom and
competing state claims favoring uniformity. The background
presumption in these cases is one of inevitable religious/ideological
plurality in public schools, even absent the contemplated state actions.
Finally, I offer a third and final claim: for community-builders,
maintenance problems are easier than creation problems. This point, in
turn, suggests that, while plurality may be inevitable, plurality within a
communal structure holds greater hope for lines of division to be
overcome. This is because the culture intrinsic to a community can serve
as an adhesive across lines of division. Thus, to the extent that one finds
the goals of community and unity to be worthwhile, at least some of the
time, this observation implies that mechanisms that situate plurality
within community are often preferable to letting plurality persist between
distinct communities.
In recent months, much commentary has been written on student activism and
engagement in racial issues on university campuses. These events intersect with
some of the deepest and most important themes in American law and politics.
Among those themes are three in particular, which are the focus of this article:
uniformity, diversity, and community. Consider the events at Yale University, one
of the most discussed recent instances of campus debate.1 As has been detailed in a
1

See, e.g., Jelani Cobb, Race and the Free Speech Diversion, NEW YORKER (Nov. 11,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/race-and-the-free-speech-diversion
[https://perma.cc/7GN8-LCVB] (discussing the unrest that occurred at Yale University);
Jelani Cobb, What Divides Us?: An Interview with Yale College Dean Jonathan Holloway,
NEW YORKER (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-dividesus-an-interview-with-yale-college-dean-jonathan-holloway [https://perma.cc/SN3C-4S98]
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number of publications, an initial email by the Yale Intercultural Affairs
Committee in late October 2015 urged students to be sensitive and judicious in
their choice of Halloween costumes. The email stated:
Yale is a community that values free expression as well as inclusivity.
And while students, undergraduate and graduate, definitely have a right
to express themselves, we would hope that people would actively avoid
those circumstances that threaten our sense of community or disrespects,
alienates or ridicules segments of our population based on race,
nationality, religious belief or gender expression.2

(discussing an interview the Dean of Yale College); David Cole, Yale: The Power of
Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/11/18/
yale-power-of-speech/ [https://perma.cc/WH5D-R4HA] (discussing the controversy
surrounding Yale protests and similar controversies on other college campuses); Conor
Friedersdorf, The New Intolerance of Student Activism, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-new-intolerance-of-studentactivism-at-yale/414810/ [https://perma.cc/D2TY-GLXB] (discussing the nature of
modern-day student activism); Todd Gitlin, Why Are Student Protesters So Fearful?, N.Y.
TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/opinio
n/sunday/why-are-student-protesters-so-fearful.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4BMG-VG67]
(discussing the message students convey in response to Yale events); Nicholas Kristof,
Mizzou, Yale and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Nov. 11, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/mizzou-yale-and-free-speech.html [https://
perma.cc/4HTN-TCBH] (discussing students across the nation speaking about racial
tensions in universities, specifically University of Missouri and Yale); Suzanne Nossel,
Opinion Editorial, Who Is Entitled to Be Heard?, N.Y. TIMES: THE OPINION PAGES (Nov.
12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/who-is-entitled-to-be-heard.html
[https://perma.cc/6TYB-QHZW] (discussing racial tensions at Yale and consequent
protests); Meghan O’Rourke, Yale’s Unsafe Spaces, NEW YORKER: CULTURAL COMMENT
(Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/yales-unsafe-spaces
[https://perma.cc/6TRQ-RTB7] (discussing the rights and reasonable “expectations” of
students at Yale); George Packer, A Hard Rain at Mizzou and Yale, NEW YORKER: DAILY
COMMENT (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/thestruggles-at-mizzou-and-yale [https://perma.cc/X9AF-N9AY] (discussing students at Yale
and University of Missouri protesting racial oppression); Liam Stack, Yale’s Halloween
Advice Stokes a Racially Charged Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/09/nyregion/yale-culturally-insensitive-halloweencostumes-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/JV8P-59NV] (discussing racial tension at
Yale); Rachel L. Swarns, Yale College Dean Torn by Racial Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/nyregion/yale-college-dean-torn-byracial-protests.html [https://perma.cc/76A8-CGRD] (discussing the struggles of the Dean
of Yale College over student protests).
2
FIRE, Email from the Intercultural Affairs Committee, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL
RTS. IN EDUC. (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/email-from-intercultural-affairs/
[https://perma.cc/RY6F-2XYL].
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Following this, Erika Christakis, the associate master of Silliman College (one of
Yale’s residential colleges), sent an email to the students in that college expressing
qualms about the Intercultural Affairs Committee’s email for being somewhat
paternalistic. As her email stated in part:
I don’t wish to trivialize genuine concerns about cultural and personal
representation, and other challenges to our lived experience in a plural
community. I know that many decent people have proposed guidelines
on Halloween costumes from a spirit of avoiding hurt and offense. I laud
those goals, in theory, as most of us do. But in practice, I wonder if we
should reflect more transparently, as a community, on the consequences
of an institutional (which is to say: bureaucratic and administrative)
exercise of implied control over college students.3
Christakis’s email, however, prompted a strong negative reaction from at least a
portion of the student body,4 and many quickly linked the email to broader
concerns about race at Yale. Among other items, related topics included the
underrepresentation of racial minorities in the faculty5 and the visible legacy of
slavery on campus—most notably in the form of a residential college being named
for John C. Calhoun.6 A video of Nicholas Christakis—the spouse of Erika
Christakis and the master of Silliman College—engaging in a heated discussion
with a visibly upset student in the aftermath of the email exchange went viral and
helped to elevate this debate in the public consciousness.7
Some individuals articulated their views in detail in an “Open Letter to
Associate Master Christakis” by “Concerned Yale Students, Alumni, Family,
Faculty, and Staff.” As the letter concluded:
To be a student of color on Yale’s campus is to exist in a space that was
not created for you. From the Eurocentric courses, to the lack of diversity
in the faculty, to the names of slave owners and traders that adorn most
of the buildings on campus—all are reminders that Yale’s history is one
of exclusion. An exclusion that was based on the same stereotypes and
3

FIRE, Email from Erika Christakis: “Dressing Yourselves,” email to Silliman
College (Yale) Students on Halloween Costumes, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC.
(Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.thefire.org/email-from-erika-christakis-dressing-yourselvesemail-to-silliman-college-yale-students-on-halloween-costumes/ [https://perma.cc/8VEJRT23].
4
Cole, supra note 1; Stack, supra note 1; Swarns, supra note 1.
5
Cole, supra note 1.
6
Noah Remnick, Yale Grapples with Ties to Slavery in Debate over a College’s
Name, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/nyregion/yalein-debate-over-calhoun-college-grapples-with-ties-to-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/SV3L7SSG]; Stack, supra note 1.
7
Cole, supra note 1; Stack, supra note 1.
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incorrect beliefs that students now seek to wear as costumes. Stereotypes
that many students still face to this day when navigating the university.
The purpose of blackface, yellowface, and practices like these were
meant to alienate, denigrate, and to portray people of color as something
inferior and unwelcome in society. To see that replicated on college
campuses only reinforces the idea that this is a space in which we do not
belong.8
Continued engagement between students and the Yale administration subsequently
led to the articulation of a broader plan for campus diversity by university
president Peter Salovey. In the opening paragraphs of his message, Salovey states:
I have heard the expressions of those who do not feel fully included at
Yale, many of whom have described experiences of isolation, and even
of hostility, during their time here. It is clear that we need to make
significant changes so that all members of our community truly feel
welcome and can participate equally in the activities of the university,
and to reaffirm and reinforce our commitment to a campus where hatred
and discrimination are never tolerated.
We begin this work by laying to rest the claim that it conflicts with our
commitment to free speech, which is unshakeable. The very purpose of
our gathering together into a university community is to engage in
teaching, learning, and research — to study and think together,
sometimes to argue with and challenge one another, even at the risk of
discord, but always to take care to preserve our ability to learn from one
another.9

8

Ryan Wilson, Open Letter to Associate Master Christakis, DOWN MAG. (Oct. 31,
2015), http://downatyale.com/post.php?id=430 [https://perma.cc/VA2Y-WBEU].
9
Peter Salovey, Statement from President Salovey: Toward a Better Yale,
YALENEWS (Nov. 17, 2015), http://news.yale.edu/2015/11/17/statement-president-saloveytoward-better-yale [https://perma.cc/7VCK-SNUY].
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As noted above, a number of important questions on racial identity, racial equality,
and free speech underlie these disagreements. But most pertinent for this Article is
the underlying presumption of “community” in all of these quoted statements. All
of the statements invoke an ideal vision of community characterized by a form of
unity or commonality—whether that might be an equality of concern and respect
for all members, equal inclusion, or equal opportunity to speak (and to be
disagreed with). At the same time, each statement contemplates the notion of an
ideal community characterized by difference—whether that might be racial,
cultural, or ethnic difference, or difference characterized by divergent viewpoints
and sensibilities.
***
Of course, as far as major political disagreements in American history go, the
case of Yale in 2015 offers a relatively mild example. Aside from the fact that Yale
is a privileged institution,10 one suspects that there is a limit beyond which political
disagreements will never escalate, if only because its students, faculty, and staff
are thrown together into a community that is characterized by a degree of intimacy,
geographic proximity, and transience that while common to many university
communities, may be quite uncommon in comparison to other sectors of American
life. Still, even if the Yale example may have limited relevance for other
contexts—at least in certain respects—its invocation of the notion of community
speaks strongly to the timeliness of inquiries about community at present. The
Yale case serves to remind us that such debates over community, commonality,
and difference are persistent in our society.
Indeed, references to “culture wars” have long been a staple in American
social and political life.11 Such debates have often raised the specter of enduring
differences in America, but at times have carried much less optimism than some of
the Yale speakers about a broader community being capable of overcoming
differences.12 In this regard, consider two quotations referencing the debate within

10

Phoebe Maltz Bovy, Who’s Afraid of Yale Student Privilege?, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/123912/whos-afraid-of-yale-studentprivilege [https://perma.cc/T4S4-STBG].
11
Probably the most recent version of these debates, prior to those in the present,
were in the 1990s. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE
STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991) (discussing the culture war surrounding education);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY (1992) (discussing studies on different cultures present in
society); Diane Ravitch, Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures, 59 AM. SCHOLAR 337 (1990)
(discussing how race, ethnicity, and religion have always been a source of conflict in
American education).
12
See, e.g., John Higham’s prominent study of activism in American history.
Nativism is defined by historian John Higham as follows:
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the Supreme Court over mandatory flag salutes in public schools in the 1940s. In
defense of the mandatory flag salute in Minersville v. Gobitis,13 Justice Frankfurter
stated:
The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive
sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind
and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people,
transmit them from generation to generation, and thereby create that
continuity of a treasured common life which constitutes a civilization.
‘We live by symbols.’ The flag is the symbol of our national unity,
transcending all internal differences, however large, within the
framework of the Constitution.14
However, in later overruling Gobitis in the subsequent case of West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,15 Justice Jackson stated for the Court that:
Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any
provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and
whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite
in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is
the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means
to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian
unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.
Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves
only the unanimity of the graveyard.16
Whether the nativist was a workingman or a Protestant evangelist, a southern
conservative or a northern reformer, he stood for a certain kind of nationalism.
He believed—whether he was trembling at a Catholic menace to American
liberty, fearing an invasion of pauper labor, or simply rioting against the great
English actor William Macready—that some influence originating abroad
threatened the very life of the nation from within. Nativism, therefore, should be
defined as intense opposition to an internal minority on the ground of its foreign
(i.e., “un-American”) connections . . . . While drawing on much broader cultural
antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to
destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life.
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860–1925 4
(2008).
13
310 U.S. 586 (1940).
14
Id. at 596.
15
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
16
Id. at 641.
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The exchange between Frankfurter and Jackson hints at perhaps the fundamental
problem of American political community: in a society that will always be marked
by some degree of pluralism, diversity must be accommodated if stability is to be
maintained. Yet, even if Frankfurter’s position may seem far out of line with
modern sentiments, it does hint at a question that continues to occupy us: is there a
point at which a community cannot and should not accommodate pluralism in the
name of unity?17 On the one hand, a society or community characterized by too
much plurality will have little within it to provide a common ground for bridging
differences and binding community members together across the major lines of
division. Yet, as Jackson notes,18 too much of an emphasis on unity by the state or
majorities—as a means to contain or remedy those societal differences—opens the
door for equally worrisome concerns about the coercion of individuals and
repression of differences.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article attempts to probe at these questions of unity and difference in the
American political community by examining judicial rulings on public
education—specifically judicial rulings dealing with race and public education,
and judicial rulings dealing with religiously-based or ideologically-based
differences and public education.19 There are obviously a number of potentially
fruitful avenues for interrogating these questions. But the focus of this inquiry on
judicial opinions dealing with public education possesses some obvious attractions.
For example, because elementary and secondary public schools perhaps constitute
the most direct point of contact between most American children and the state,
these institutions have the opportunity to shape future participants in the American
political community and to impart the particular values that will help constitute
17

Rawls opens the exploration of his theory of “political liberalism” by asking this
fundamental question: “how is it possible for there to exist over time a stable and just
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines?” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxvii (1996).
18
See infra Part III.
19
Among the cases I discuss that touch on religiously-based and ideologically-based
plurality in public schools, the focus of most is on religion. Still, I will alternately refer to
these cases as dealing with “religion” or “religion/ideology.” Judges and scholars have
attempted to articulate how and why religiously-based beliefs should be treated differently
from nonreligious beliefs. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1231–36 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing religion and the
Constitution). Yet, I largely treat the two similarly because the commonly-noted
distinctions matter less for my purposes. In my argument, both are juxtaposed to racebased plurality, and within this comparison, the issues surrounding religiously-based and
ideologically-based plurality overlap with each other to a much greater extent than either
overlaps with race-based plurality in public schools.
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that community. Not surprisingly then, the topic of education has drawn the
sustained attention of scholars focused on some of the deepest questions of
American democracy and society.20
Relatedly, my focus on judicial conceptions of political community in the
public school context provides the key attraction of hearing governing actors
examine these questions in the very fruitful context of judicial opinions. Within
this form of political communication, we see judges discuss themes such as the
pivotal role public schools play in shaping future American citizens, what binds
Americans together into a political community, and what points of divergence may
be desirable, acceptable, undesirable, or prohibited under the law. And
importantly, judges have often discussed these themes, at times, in the language of
abstract political, legal, and ethical principles. Thus, even if judicial conceptions of
political community may only reflect beliefs specific to a subset of Americans,
they have often been stated with admirable clarity, and they have likely been
representative of some of the most influential conceptions of political community.
Beyond this focus on education and the judiciary, why focus specifically on
racial and religious differences? First, race and religion have historically
constituted two of the most significant dimensions of cleavage or segmentation in
American society. This history commends these two doctrinal areas as attractive
contexts for interrogating judicial thoughts on unity and difference. One suspects
that judicial consideration of questions of unity and difference in these cases is
aided and enriched by, for example, the weighty background of Jim Crow school
segregation,21 or the extended history of Catholic-Protestant conflict in the context
of elementary and secondary education.22 Second, the comparison of race and
religion seems ripe for drawing out some key differences between these two
contexts as well. With the former, we are dealing with a dimension of identity that
is largely treated in constitutional doctrine as central and immutable to individuals.
Religion, on the other hand, while also commonly recognized as central and
somewhat intergenerational, is not an immutable dimension of identity and thus
diverges in some respects from how many view matters of race, gender, and sexual

20

See, e.g., EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 2–7 (1997) (discussing what gets excluded from political debate
about education); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 11–13 (1987) (discussing the
goals of a democratic education); MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION 132–70 (1999) (discussing education policy); MORAL AND POLITICAL
EDUCATION 1–19 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) (discussing education in a
liberal democracy); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 231–54 (2000) (discussing civic purposes and public
schools).
21
See infra Section II.A.
22
MACEDO, supra note 20, at 41; DAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON GROUND: PUBLIC
SCHOOLS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 23–24 (2003).
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orientation.23 Exploring how the Court articulates its vision of political community
across two similar but distinct forms of individual identity thus presents
opportunities to analyze and contrast them.
In this article, I make three primary claims. First, when we examine the key
cases on race and public education, and religion/ideology and public education, we
see similar language from the Supreme Court emphasizing the crucial role of
public schools in serving as an adhesive force in American society across both
racial and religious difference. I further assert that the Court has viewed public
schools as crucial in helping to forge a common culture across racial and religious
lines. Second, these key cases also demonstrate a crucial point of divergence.
While the judiciary has primarily been concerned with problems of political
community-creation in the race context, it has primarily been concerned with
problems of political community-maintenance in the religion/ideological context.
Finally, for community-builders confronting stubborn lines of division, problems
of maintenance are generally preferable to problems of community-creation.
A. Adhesive Structures in American Society and Cultural Commonality
Before elaborating on my primary claims, however, let me first clarify some
preliminary concepts. Much of what follows in this article will be a discussion of
racial and religious/ideological plurality, but some discussion is warranted up front
regarding the opposing force in these questions: the adhesive or cohesive
mechanisms that function to bind members of the American political community
together. In this vein, consider first John Higham’s delineation of three forms of
unity, or three types of “cohesive structures” that, he argued, have historically
23

In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed the indictment of George
Reynolds for engaging in bigamy in violation of federal law. Consider this statement by the
Court on the difference between religiously-motivated conduct versus religious belief—
thereby drawing a sharp outer limit to how far it would respect religious identity, and
underscoring the dimensions of both “conduct” and “status” for religious identity:
This being so, the only question which remains is, whether those who make
polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute.
If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief
may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and
go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are
made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed
that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be
seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not
interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty
to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the
power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?
98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
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helped constitute American society to different degrees.24 These cohesive
structures include (a) “primordial unity,” which Higham defined as “a corporate
feeling of oneness that infuses a particular, concrete, unquestioned set of inherited
relationships.”25 Within this category, Higham has in mind very localized, specific
interpersonal connections firmly rooted within a community defined by location
and/or a complex web of family, extended family, neighbor, and friendship
relations.26 Next there is (b) “ideological unity,” which Higham defined as
“explicit systems of general beliefs that give large bodies of people a common
identity and purpose, a common program of action, and a standard for selfcriticism.”27 Of interest for Higham in this regard were two ideologies in
particular: American Protestantism and American nationalism.28 Finally, perhaps
of least relevance for our purposes, Higham also discussed (c) “technical unity,”
which he defined as “a reordering of human relations by rational procedures
designed to maximize efficiency. Technical unity connects people by occupation
function rather than ideological faith.”29
Higham acknowledged that these three forms of unity were hardly exhaustive
of all cohesive structures in American history.30 Indeed, while they are quite useful
in understanding a range of contexts and historical eras, none seems to fully speak
to the kind of unity or adhesive force that would be capable of binding a large,
pluralistic society together in the face of racially-based or religiously-based
plurality. For example, primordial forms of unity would seem to have little
relevance in larger social units. Technical forms of unity would seem to have little
relevance beyond clearly defined, collective endeavors in the commercial context.
Of the three, perhaps ideological forms of unity come closest to having relevance
for our purposes. Yet even ideology—at least if it is understood as an appeal to
abstract principles such as, say, liberty or equality—still seems insufficient on its
own to explain large-scale American societal cohesion across racial or religious
lines. My skepticism stems from two concerns: First, given that abstract concepts
such as liberty or equality have broad international, if not near-universal appeal, it
is not obvious why such concepts would be central in binding Americans,
specifically, together within an American political community. That is, why would
a strong commitment to these ideals between two or more individuals necessarily
24

I have previously discussed Higham and several of the other authors in this section
in the context of examining judicial and scholarly arguments about abortion rights
alongside debates over American political community. Stuart Chinn, Universal Arguments
and Particular Arguments on Abortion Rights, 75 MD. L. REV. 247, 267–69 (2015).
25
JOHN HIGHAM, HANGING TOGETHER: UNITY AND DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 5 (Carl J. Guarneri ed., 2001).
26
Id. at 5–7.
27
Id. at 7–8. The emphasis on ideology as a cornerstone of American political
identity is a common theme in the literature.
28
HIGHAM, supra note 25, at 8–14.
29
Id. at 14.
30
Id. at 5.
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identify each to the other as American, or create an expectation that they would
find a shared connection around their national identity?
Second, and relatedly, given the abstractness of these ideals, they are by
definition open to interpretation and sometimes wildly different applications. It is
questionable then how strong a foundation such ideals could provide for forging
connections between members of a political community—particularly if strong,
political disagreements lurk in the background. This is not to deny that there may
be stability-promoting or adhesive benefits to common societal acceptance of
vague, but attractive, political ideals. Vague and contestable conceptions of
equality and liberty, for example, have likely contributed, at times, to the stability
of the American governmental system in providing conceptual space for competing
political parties and competing constituencies to continue dialoging with each
other. Still, such benefits of ambiguity seem much more likely to characterize
political communities already structured by other, more fundamental adhesive
forces. That is to say, abstract ideals could be a supplementary cohesive force, but
it is not clear that on their own they could provide much sense of deep belonging
and connection.
Others have elaborated on the ideological theme and focused on political
narratives as crucial in providing cohesion to American society.31 Such arguments

31

David Hollinger emphasizes the importance of civic nationalism as a cohesive
force for Americans, hinting at a nationalism based in ideology and in culture (though the
emphasis seems to be more on the former). Hollinger, however, does not elaborate in much
detail on the content of this civic nationalism, since his focus is more on developing a
“postethnic” ideal in the context of individual identity. DAVID HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC
AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 134, 140, 215–16 (Rev. ed. 2005). Similar to
Hollinger, Kenneth Karst also emphasizes “civic culture” as the primary adhesive force in
American society. Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 361–77 (1986). In a somewhat different vein, consider
arguments put forth by Rogers Smith and Gary Gerstle. Smith has emphasized “stories of
peoplehood” as a crucial adhesive structure in creating and maintaining political
community. In this regard, Smith emphasizes the importance of three kinds or types of
stories of peoplehood: economic stories, political power stories, and ethically constitutive
stories. ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP 60 (2003). Of particular interest for our purposes, Smith defines
ethically constitutive stories as follows: “Such stories proclaim that members’ culture,
religion, language, race, ethnicity, ancestry, history, or other such factors are constitutive of
their very identities as persons, in ways that both affirm their worth and delineate their
obligations.” Id. at 64–65. Relatedly, Gary Gerstle has written on the existence of a civic
nationalist narrative in American politics that has coexisted with a racial nationalist
narrative—focusing in particular on the twentieth century. See GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN
CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5–13 (2002). To the extent that
Smith and Gerstle are read to be in support of more ideologically-based adhesive
structures, I would offer the same critiques to their arguments that are mentioned above. If,
however, Smith and Gerstle’s theories are open to the notion of more culturally-based
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often address the first concern noted above in emphasizing how certain abstract
principles—when situated within a historical narrative specific to events and
individuals in American history—could provide bonds of community that are
peculiarly American. And yet, I remain skeptical that even historically grounded
ideological narratives can entirely explain why Americans would necessarily feel
bound to one another in a lasting, substantive way. More likely, such civic
narratives would often seem to function more symbolically as representative of
communal bonds that already exist. That is, they are more likely an unthinking
point of reference to symbolize and concretize such bonds. For any American selfconsciously reflecting on why they feel a sense of connection with another
American, however, it strikes me as questionable that foremost in their mind would
be a replay of high school civics or a reference to distant historical figures.
I would tentatively propose that at least in the context of society-wide
connections in America that are not primarily constituted by other types of
relationships (geographic, professional, economic, personal, etc.), a crucial
adhesive force is ultimately cultural. Such cultural influences can be partly
ideological in nature, and may be partly dependent upon abstract notions of
equality, liberty and/or more historically grounded ideological narratives. But more
centrally, I use the term “culture” to refer to a connection or bond that is rooted in
experience and interaction—something more grounded rather than abstract. My
references to “culture” below thus refer to a set of common experiences, common
cultural reference points, everyday norms, traditions, and spatial references (such
as buildings, streets, and landmarks) that two or more individuals may feel a
connection to by virtue of having been in the same kinds of places at the same
moments in time (or at the same stages in life). In short, these are markers of
community and belongingness that are not the high-minded points of commonality
that one necessarily invokes in speeches about America. Rather, these are the items
that constitute everyday experiences that may largely exist in the background, and
that may only come into focus when individuals find themselves in a context
where suddenly certain items are not taken for granted as common.
I should note that for these aspects of culture to serve as an adhesive structure
across community, what is crucial is not whether such experiences actually are
common to all members. Rather, the adhesive function of culture as I define it
stems more from the plausible perception of commonality.32 Thus, this notion of a
forms of adhesion, as I define them in the main text, my argument may indeed align with
their emphasis on the importance of narratives in structuring political community.
32
One of the more prominent arguments in defense of the notion that culture
constitutes the core of American political identity is MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN
NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5–15 (1995).
As he states, “[a] real nation is a concrete historical community, defined primarily by a
common language, common folkways, and a common vernacular culture.” Id. at 5. Lind’s
belief that there actually is a common culture defined by common norms and experiences is
distinct from what I am suggesting here. There may be such a common ground as an
empirical matter, though I am skeptical. The common culture that I refer to above is
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cultural adhesive force that is rooted in perception builds upon Benedict
Anderson’s famous description of national political communities as, in part,
“imagined communities” of individuals who would never know or meet each
other.33 Speaking directly to the notion of shared experiences (or perceived shared
experiences) creating cohesion within the national political community, Anderson
states the following in discussing the cohesive force of newspapers, specifically:
The obsolescence of the newspaper on the morrow of its
printing . . . nonetheless, for just this reason, creates this extraordinary
mass ceremony: the almost precisely simultaneous consumption
(“imagining”) of the newspaper-as-fiction. We know that particular
morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly be consumed
between this hour and that, only on this day, not that . . . The significance
of this mass ceremony . . . is paradoxical. It is performed in silent
privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that
the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by
thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet
of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this
ceremony is incessantly repeated at daily or half-daily intervals
throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure for the secular,
historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?34
Recognizing the crucial role of perceptions in binding Americans together
implies that these bonds may be frayed if individuals perceive that their
experiences are widely divergent from certain segments of Americans. The role of
cultural perceptions also indicates that the state has a potentially useful role to play
in cultivating societal cohesion by facilitating the perception of common
experiences, and indeed, such a role aligns with how judges and theorists of
American society have viewed public education over time.
B. Judicial Conceptions of Community in Public Schools
Having articulated some preliminary thoughts on American political
community and some of the forces at work in binding community members
together, let me conclude this part by beginning to flesh out what will be the focus
of this Article: plurality within the American political community. As an initial
point, it is worth emphasizing that political community in America is obviously not
premised in part upon actual conditions in American life and individual perceptions of
American life. In many cases, I suspect, the perception is more crucial in binding
Americans together than the reality.
33
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6–7 (rev. ed. 1991).
34
Id. at 35, 42–45 (citations omitted).
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a monolithic entity. More accurately, and as suggested by Higham’s comments
quoted above, American society is characterized by multiple forms of community
and multiple lines of division. My focus here is on conceptions of political
community in public schools, where the primary concerns are racial and religious
differences. The dynamics I will discuss may be different to greater or lesser
degrees in other contexts of American community-building. Still, given the
centrality of public education, racial identity, and religious identity, I am
presuming that the dynamics discussed here will partially illuminate other types of
community in America as well.
In examining the community-building role of public schools in the context of
both racial and religious/ideological difference, I find that a comparison of these
two doctrinal areas ultimately yields three key findings. The first is a point of
similarity across the racial and religious contexts that I examine in Part II. Within
the judiciary’s opinions that grapple with racial and religious/ideological
difference in the context of public education, one might glean a set of judicial
beliefs common to both contexts on the adhesive force of public education in
creating and maintaining political community. Judges see public schools as a
unifying force across both types of plurality. More precisely, and in line with
preceding comments, I will claim that judges have, at least implicitly, seen public
schools as providing a cultural adhesive influence. Public schools bind members
together via the physical proximity of students to one another and their observation
in, participation in, and creation of a common culture.
My focus on culture in this context underscores the point that, at least as
judges have discussed the functions of public schools in these cases, they have not
viewed the cohesiveness of political community (as represented by the public
school) as being merely ideological in nature. If that were the case, presumably
political community could be cultivated by the teaching of common ideals in a
variety of schools separated by race and/or religion. The desire for physical
proximity between students of different races and religions implied in these cases
would seem unnecessary. The fact that students’ physical exposure to plurality is a
concern for judges speaks to the importance the latter have often placed on the
adhesive benefits of culture. That is, what we glean from these cases is a judicial
belief in how ideals grounded in discrete experiences can bind students together.
If both the race and religion/ideology cases overlap in demonstrating a
common judicial belief in how public schools can nurture a cohesive common
culture, they also overlap in another sense: these cases also set forth clearly
demarcated limits on the ability of the state to utilize public schools toward these
cohesive ends. While the particular limits differ across the race and
religious/ideological contexts, judges have viewed these limits as a constraint upon
the community-building functions that public schools may perform in either
context.
This doctrinal comparison between race and religion/ideology yields a key
difference too, and this constitutes my second primary claim that I flesh out in Part
III: in the race and public education context, the central problem that has appeared
in the doctrine—and the main problem that has animated judicial conceptions of
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community in that context—has been the problem of community-creation. Judges
have largely pondered the justifications and limits upon the state’s authority to
create racial plurality in public schools. Such arguments proceed from background
assumptions of minimal racial plurality absent the contemplated state actions.
In contrast, in the religion/ideology and public education context, the major
cases and judicial arguments on plurality within public schools are preoccupied
with the problems of community-maintenance. Judges have pondered the
justifications and limits upon state actions to maintain stable communities in public
schools in the face of individual claims of religious freedom and competing state
claims favoring uniformity. In contrast to the racial context, the background
presumption here is inevitable religious/ideological plurality in public schools,
even absent the contemplated state actions. This in turn, however, leads to the
problem of maintenance: we see the judiciary in this context grappling with the
problem of how best to fashion stable community out of inescapably disparate
parts.
Finally, in Part IV, I return to the example of Yale University and offer my
third and final claim: for community-builders, maintenance problems are easier
than creation problems. This point, in turn, suggests that while plurality may be
inevitable, plurality within a communal structure holds greater hope for lines of
division to be overcome. This is because the culture intrinsic to a community can
potentially serve as an adhesive across lines of division. Thus, to the extent that
one finds the goals of community and unity to be worthwhile, this observation
implies that mechanisms that situate plurality within community are often
preferable to those that let plurality persist between distinct communities.
II. CULTURAL COMMONALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
In this Part and the next, I explore a limited but significant subset of cases that
deal with racial and religious/ideological differences in American public education.
More precisely, I focus on cases—which are all Supreme Court cases with one
notable exception—that are commonly recognized as pivotal in their respective
doctrinal contexts. In addition, I focus only on those cases where the opinions
explicitly contemplate and grapple with the problem of plurality and political
community-building within public schools. Thus, for example, I devote much
attention to the prominent free exercise case of Mozert v. Hawkins35 below because
in that case the judges of the Sixth Circuit had to confront a conflict between a
school district’s choice of curriculum and the religious beliefs of some children
and their parents.36
35

827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
In contrast, I have very little discussion on some of the pivotal cases in the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence regarding state aid to private, religious schools. Such
cases do intersect with themes of religious plurality and public education, and as such, they
do figure into some of the scholarly debates discussed in both Parts II and III. Still, these
36
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Using some significant cases that fall within the above noted parameters as
the focal point of our discussion, I will proceed to make a set of claims about how
the judiciary views the problems and possibilities of political community-building
in public schools across the racial and religious/ideological contexts. The focus in
this Part will be on the first claim noted above: judges have seen public schools as
an adhesive force in American society across racial and religious lines by virtue of
their role in bringing diverse groups of students into close contact with one
another—thereby creating a common culture. The test for whether my claims seem
plausible relies, in part, upon whether my choice of cases can be seen as fairly
representative of the broader doctrinal themes in both of these contexts.
A. Race and Public Education: Adhesive Structures
In Brown v. Board of Education,37 Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the
Court emphasized the importance of public education with this memorable
comment:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.38
Within this passage, Warren mentioned that elementary and secondary schools
fulfill three key social functions, two of which clearly speak to the role of public
schools in facilitating a cohesive political community. The first theme was the
notion of public schools preparing students for citizenship and its future
responsibilities. The second theme, which may be seen as either a corollary to the
citizenship theme or an idea somewhat distinct from it, was that schools impart
cases depart from our focus in that they deal with religious plurality beyond the confines of
a public educational institution, and speak to a more systemic plurality. See, e.g., Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (allowing transportation expenses of parents sending
their children to religious schools to be reimbursed by the state). See generally John C.
Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 279, 288–89 (2001) (summarizing the history of modern Establishment Clause
cases).
37
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38
Id. at 493.
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certain core norms and values to students.39 The third theme, which perhaps has
fewer implications for political community-building, was the notion that schools
are crucial in aiding the professional training and development of students.40
Warren was not articulating this view of public education purely in the
abstract. The background context was the Court’s dismantling of Jim Crow
segregated schooling. Thus, in order for elementary and secondary public
educational institutions to serve these functions, racial segregation could not be
allowed. As Warren stated in a memorable line: “To separate them [AfricanAmerican children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”41 Warren’s
famous conclusion in Brown was that the physical separation of African-American
and white students in public schools was inherently unequal.42 Unlike its earlier
rulings in the context of higher public education, the Court made it clear in Brown
that segregated public educational institutions, even with equal resources, would
never meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.43
Much commentary has been written subsequently—and continues to be
written—on the precise harm the Court meant to rectify in prohibiting segregated
public schools in Brown. Was Warren’s inclusive vision of public education
undermined by the legally-mandated nature of racial separation between AfricanAmerican and white students? Or was Warren’s vision primarily undermined by
the fact or existence of racial separation between African-American and white
students?44
Regardless of whether de jure or de facto segregation was the primary harm
that Brown was meant to address, it was quite clear that the actual, stark physical
separation of African-American and white students was, at the least, a significant
point of concern for the Brown Court. This, in turn, suggests that the role of public
schools in imparting or inculcating the duties of citizenship or other core norms
39

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 113–15 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221–22.
41
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
42
Id. at 495.
43
Id. at 491–92, 494–95. The Court had declined to directly overrule Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and its allowance for segregated education, four years
prior to Brown in the case of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635–36 (1950). In the same
vein, see also, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950).
44
To use the terms commonly employed in the literature, some believe Brown stands
for the prohibition of racial classifications in the law, or an anticlassification principle.
Others, however, believe Brown stands for a principle of antisubordination: it supports the
prohibition of laws that function to subordinate racial minorities (regardless of whether
those laws employ racial classifications or not). STUART L. CHINN, RECALIBRATING
REFORM: THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL CHANGE 153 (2014). My own view is that both
principles can be plausibly linked to the Brown ruling. Id. at 176–77.
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was, to some extent, undermined by a system of schools that physically separated
white students from minority students. Even if such values could be imparted to
white and African-American children in “separate but equal” schools, this would
still be a constitutionally insufficient discharge of the duties of these institutions.
Implied within Brown then was recognition of the fact that public schools more
precisely serve a function of educating students within racially pluralistic public
schools. I would suggest that the function of schools that Warren hints at, if only
implicitly, is a function of creating common cultural bonds between students of
different races.
We see this judicial concern with “plurality in practice,” within the Brown
Court’s notable—and disappointing for some—discussion of the remedy, where it
would allow desegregation to take place “with all deliberate speed.”45 Such
language, and the judicial concerns regarding implementation underlying it,46
indicated an awareness by the Court that actual, physical integration on a
significant scale was a desired (eventual) implication of its original ruling in
Brown. Similarly, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of actual integration when it confronted specific instances of school
districts attempting to desegregate. For example, in Green v. County Board of New
Kent City,47 the Court unanimously agreed that the school district’s attempt to
desegregate its public schools through a freedom-of-choice plan was insufficient.48
As Justice Brennan stated, underscoring the importance of actual integration: “The
burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.”49 Brennan was
responding to a finding that subsequent to the school district’s implementation of
the freedom-of-choice plan, the statistics on public school attendance had not
demonstrated much change in terms of racial integration in actual practice.50 Two
years later in the case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education,51
the Court unanimously approved a desegregation plan proposed by the federal
district court that involved a number of actions—including bussing—that aimed to
encourage actual integration.52
Contained within these opinions is a view by the Justices of what is required
for public schools to serve their various social functions—including their adhesive
functions. For public schools to adequately serve and discharge their goals of
shaping citizens, imparting core values, and aiding students in their professional
development, at least some degree of physical interaction between AfricanAmerican and white students would be necessary (though the question of how
45

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 742–49 (2004).
47
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
48
Id. at 441–42.
49
Id. at 439.
50
Id. at 441.
51
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
52
Id. at 22, 31.
46
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much interaction might be constitutionally required or allowed was a separate one,
as I discuss below).53
Consider next what the judiciary has said in the context of race and public
higher education, where some of the above noted themes recur, but in a different
form. Here again, the Court has articulated how public educational institutions can
promote political community through cultural mechanisms. The most prominent of
these judicial arguments have emphasized “diversity.”54 The underlying
implication of diversity arguments is that political community can be promoted
among a racially diverse cohort of students by virtue of an institution bringing
them together and facilitating their interaction. Consistent with the judicial
decisions on integration in the context of elementary and secondary schools,
judicial opinions here hint at a belief that “diversity” in higher education facilitates
communal cohesion by letting students engage with each other in close physical
proximity—thereby creating, I would argue, a common culture.
Justice Powell memorably mentioned diversity in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke55 where, in his opinion for a divided Court, he focused on
“diversity” as a compelling justification for affirmative action sufficient to pass
constitutional muster under a strict scrutiny/equal protection analysis.56 While also
rejecting several other potential justifications for affirmative action as not
compelling,57 Powell stated that diversity did qualify:58
53

To be sure, one might critique the preceding argument by questioning whether the
goals of citizenship, values inculcation, or individual development were viewed by judges
as inherently connected to the physical exposure of African-American and white students
to each other—and flowed from the creation of a common culture—or were just incidental
to that interaction. Indeed, to the latter point, one might argue that the Court’s rulings
facilitated these benefits of public education for African-Americans not necessarily by the
mandated physical interaction of African-American and white students with each other, but
rather by allowing African-American students access to the better quality of education that
existed in predominately or uniformly white schools. That is, the Court’s preoccupation
with integration was perhaps seen by the Justices as more instrumental rather than as a
desirable end in itself. Perhaps this is true, though if we take the above noted quotation by
Warren at face value, his Brown opinion suggests otherwise.
54
See infra pp. 27–30.
55
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
56
Id. at 314–15.
57
Id. at 305–11 (1978). The four justifications for affirmative action the Court
considered were:
(i) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical
schools and in the medical profession”; (ii) countering the effects of societal
discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in
communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. It is necessary to decide
which, if any, of these purposes is substantial enough to support the use of a
suspect classification. Id. at 306 (citations omitted).
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The atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation”—so essential
to the quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by
a diverse student body. As the Court noted in Keyishian, it is not too
much to say that the “nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure” to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as
this Nation of many peoples.59
Justice O’Connor further elaborated on the diversity rationale in writing for a
five-vote majority in Grutter v. Bollinger,60 where the Court upheld the Michigan
Law School’s affirmative action program.61 O’Connor reaffirmed the diversity
goal as a justification for affirmative action.62 She likewise spoke to how diversity
in public higher education could both aid the professional development of students
exposed to it and contribute to the creation of a national political community by
facilitating a more inclusive national culture. As O’Connor stated:
These benefits are substantial. As the District Court emphasized, the Law
School’s admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps
to break down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races.” These benefits are “important and
laudable,” because “classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and
simply more enlightening and interesting” when the students have “the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds.”
The Law School’s claim of a compelling interest is further bolstered by
its amici, who point to the educational benefits that flow from student
body diversity. In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into
evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and “better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals.”63
On the preceding point, O’Connor emphasized the strong support for affirmative
action from representatives of these various sectors of scoiety that was registered
in amicus briefs. These sources attested to the tangible benefits they saw from the
promotion of racial diversity:

58

Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 312–13 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
60
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
61
Id. at 343–44.
62
Id. at 325, 328.
63
Id. at 330 (citations omitted).
59
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These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses
have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking
retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert
that, “based on their decades of experience,” a “highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its
principle mission to provide national security.” . . . To fulfill its mission,
the military “must be selective in admissions for training and education
for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a highly qualified,
racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting.” We agree that
“it requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our
country’s other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and
selective.”64
Finally, beyond the benefits of diversity for the students exposed to it, and for
future employers and coworkers of these students, O’Connor voiced one other
benefit: the symbolic legitimacy that higher education diversity provided for elite
sectors of American society.65 The physical proximity of a more racially diverse
cast of future leaders in these higher educational institutions carried cohesive
benefits that were systemic:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All
members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this
training. As we have recognized, law schools “cannot be effective in
isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts.” Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession) must
be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and
education necessary to succeed in America.66
Thus, much like the Court’s earlier cases on elementary and secondary
education, the diversity rationale in the context of higher education affirmative
action sets forth a judicial belief that benefits flow from the physical interaction
between students of different races. To be sure, some of what the Justices refer to
64

Id. at 330–31 (citations omitted). O’Connor also nods to a defense of affirmative
action because of its benefits to citizenship development. Id. at 331–32.
65
Id. at 332–33.
66
Id. (citation omitted).
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in the above quotations are benefits to student professional development stemming
from this exposure to diversity.67 But also present in these comments are some
benefits of diversity that are less narrowly instrumental: building “cross-racial
understanding,” building empathy, and, ultimately, discovering similarities with
other students and cultivating shared experiences. By emphasizing the significance
of physical interaction across diverse students, these judicial arguments ultimately
endorse a view of communal cohesiveness premised upon cultural bonds.
B. Race and Public Education: Limits
If the preceding cases all contain statements on the adhesive benefits of
facilitating diverse racial communities within public schools, judges have also
offered a number of statements that have clarified some limits upon this
community-building function. For one thing, as noted above, race-based
affirmative action is not constitutionally required.68 But beyond this preliminary
point, at least two key limits have emerged in the doctrine spelling out judicial
beliefs on how the goals of integration and diversity must be qualified in the face
of competing rights and institutions.
The first qualification is tied to the Court’s ruling in Milliken v. Bradley69 in
1974, where the Court emphasized one crucial limit upon its vision of integrated
schooling: its aversion to racial balancing (or racial quotas) as a goal in itself.70 In
making the point, the Court established the requirement of prior intentional
discrimination by the state before aggressive desegregation remedies, like
interschool district bussing, could be employed.71 In this case, the federal district
court had set forth an interschool district desegregation remedy in response to a
problem of de jure segregation in the Detroit city schools. The proposed remedy
would bus African-American students to surrounding Detroit suburbs—and bus
white students from those suburbs into the Detroit city schools—in order to
achieve better racial balances (due to the fact that there simply were not enough
white students left in the Detroit city school district to allow for a Detroit-only
remedy).72 The Supreme Court ruled against this remedy.73 Justice Burger wrote
for the Court and clarified that he saw racial integration as a constitutionally
required goal only when pursued as a targeted response to prior, clearly defined
67

Notably, however, O’Connor does briefly discuss and notes some key race and
elementary/secondary education cases in mentioning the citizenship and norms-inculcating
functions of public schools. Id. at 331–32.
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The Court has not found higher education affirmative action programs to be
constitutionally required. See, e.g., Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1627 (2014)
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418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Id. at 749.
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Id. at 725–36.
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state acts of intentional segregation.74 The judicial pursuit of racial balancing for its
own sake, absent prior state discriminatory acts, was deemed unconstitutional.75
The Milliken Court’s stated aversion to racial balancing and racial quotas
would be a much-emphasized theme in subsequent affirmative action cases as well.
For example, Powell in Bakke noted that the U.C. Davis medical school program at
issue in that case was a preferential racial quota, and emphasized this as a reason
for why it fell short of constitutional requirements.76 Likewise, O’Connor’s
opinion in Grutter emphasized that the Michigan Law School’s affirmative action
program was not a racial quota in ultimately concluding that it passed
constitutional muster.77
This aversion to racial quotas and the requirement of prior discrimination for
integrationist remedies suggests, in a broader sense, a crucial doctrinal limitation
upon any judicial commitment to political community-building across racial lines
in public schools. These cases suggest a judicial aversion to political communitybuilding with too much of an emphasis on racial identity. Underscoring the point,
O’Connor offered a notable comment on this in the non education-related voting
rights case of Shaw v. Reno,78 where she stated:
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our
society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.
Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers.
Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us
into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the
Nation continues to aspire. It is for these reasons that race-based
districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny.79
Accordingly, in her Grutter opinion, O’Connor offered the following concluding
comment qualifying her ruling:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants with
high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 25 years
74
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32 (1971), and repeated in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
78
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from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today.80
Similarly, in his opinion for the Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1,81 Justice Roberts was even more pointed on this
concern in striking down certain types of student assignment plans that were based
in part upon the race of students:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these
cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should
allow this once again—even for very different reasons. For schools that
never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have
removed the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the
way “to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools
on a nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating
on the basis of race.82
Beyond its aversion to racial balancing absent prior acts of discrimination, a
second limit can be discerned in the doctrine upon state efforts to build racially
pluralistic communities in public schools: from judicial reticenses to preserving
local governmental authority over elementary and secondary education. For
example, as previously noted, the Court opposed the inter-district remedy at issue
in Milliken.83 Relevant to its analysis, and pressing against the proposed remedy,
was the Court’s acknowledgment of the limits of judicial power.84 Relatedly, it
also acknowledged the importance of deferring to local governmental authority in
the context of elementary and secondary education:
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern and
support for public schools and to quality of the educational
process. Thus, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, we observed
that local control over the educational process affords citizens an
opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of
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Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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Id. at 730–33, 747–48, 759 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted); id. at 797–
98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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school programs to fit local needs, and encourages “experimentation,
innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.”
The Michigan educational structure involved in this case, in common
with most States, provides for a large measure of local control, and a
review of the scope and character of these local powers indicates the
extent to which the interdistrict remedy approved by the two courts could
disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan.85
In sum then, the judicial vision of political community that emerges from
these several cases on race and public education certainly acknowledges the appeal
of racial diversity in schools. Common to both the public elementary/secondary
educational context and the public higher educational context, there is a judicial
recognition of how the physical exposure of students to those of different races
carries a number of benefits—some of which encompass adhesive, cultural
benefits in facilitating community both within the school itself and broader society.
Yet, this vision of racial diversity is qualified by judicial anxieties about racial
quotas, and by a judicial fear of its own institutional overreach.
C. Religion/Ideology and Public Schools: Adhesive Structures
In some ways, the Court’s rulings on public education in the context of
religion and ideological conflict are even more explicit in identifying the social
functions fulfilled by schools.86 First, in line with Warren’s comments in Brown,
the Court has emphasized the importance of public schools in shaping future
citizens.87 Specifically, the Court has noted that one of the functions of public
schools is imparting and instilling certain core values that are needed for good
citizenship and the maintenance of the American polity.88 Consider, for example,
this comment by the Court in the case of Ambach v. Norwick:89
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an “assimilative
force” by which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are
brought together on a broad but common ground. These perceptions of
the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the
observations of social scientists.
85

Id. at 741–43 (citations omitted). See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973).
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Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in
developing students’ attitude toward government and understanding of
the role of citizens in our society.90
Second, and related to the preceding point, certain values have been
emphasized by the Court as crucial to either good citizenship or to the maintenance
of the polity. Two of these values have been toleration and critical thinking. While
the Court has emphasized toleration and critical thinking in different contexts, the
two concepts have also overlapped in the Court’s opinions.91
In a similar vein, the Court has likewise emphasized the importance of state
neutrality (between religions, or between religion and nonreligion) and related
concepts in its Establishment Clause cases dealing with public education.92 Though
somewhat less articulate in clarifying the array of goals and purposes that public
education is meant to pursue (compared to some of the other cases discussed in
more detail below), these Establishment Clause cases also contain an implicit
vision of political community and public education. Ultimately, what ties all of
these values together—toleration, critical thinking, and state neutrality with regard
to religion—is their common opposition to religious fundamentalism. These cases
all recognize in varying degrees and in different ways the potentially destabilizing
force of fundamentalism upon the cohesiveness of a pluralistic political
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Id. (citations omitted); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
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community—whether that fundamentalism may emerge from the state or portions
of the citizenry.
Third, and related to the preceding point on values, some judicial opinions
have also lumped “good character” or character molding as another component of
the values that public schools impart to students. For example, in the case of Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser,93 the Court stated:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is
not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must
teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order.
Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—
demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.94
Finally, and in line with Warren’s opinion in Brown, the Court has also
emphasized the importance of public schools in aiding the development of students
toward becoming economically self-sufficient adults in the religion/ideology
cases.95
Much like the cases dealing with racial plurality and public education, the
judiciary has likewise noted with approval the cohesive force of public schools in
overcoming religious/ideological plurality toward building political community.
Once again, the roots of this cohesiveness must be understood as cultural, because
underlying this community-building vision of public schools is the judicial
contemplation of religious/ideological plurality existing within the public school. If
there are to be common bonds across religious/ideological difference, the
“assimilative force” of public schools does not merely reside in the values taught.
Rather the opinions implicitly presume that the cohesive force of public schools
stems in part from those values being taught, observed, and applied within a
religiously/ideologically diverse context. Community flows from the actual
practice of certain norms within diverse public schools.
By way of illustrating these points more concretely, let me discuss the case of
Mozert v. Hawkins96 in greater detail. Mozert, while not a Supreme Court case,
may be fairly taken as representative of some of the core themes and questions that
underlie the topic of religious/ideological plurality in public schools. Accordingly,
as discussed more in Part IV, it has garnered outsized attention in the scholarly
literature on religious freedom and public schools.
In Mozert, a group of Christian parents in Hawkins County, Tennessee, raised
a religious free exercise claim in opposition to some mandatory class reading
93
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materials in the public school’s curriculum.97 The adopted materials employed a
variety of stories, and the objecting parents claimed that elements of these stories
were objectionable to the religious faith they were trying to instill in their
children.98 The parents claimed that because the material in these readers
undermined their religious faith, the religious beliefs of the students (their
children) were violated, and the religious beliefs of the parents would also be
violated if they permitted their children to read these books.99 As to what precisely
was objectionable to the religious beliefs of the parents, Judge Lively stated the
following in his opinion for the court regarding Vicki Frost, the most visible
member of the plaintiff-parents:
Mrs. Frost testified that the word of God as found in the Christian Bible
“is the totality of my beliefs.” There was evidence that other members of
their churches, and even their pastors, do not agree with their position in
this case.
Mrs. Frost testified that she had spent more than 200 hours
reviewing the Holt series and had found numerous passages that
offended her religious beliefs. She stated that the offending materials fell
into seventeen categories which she listed. These ranged from such
familiar concerns of fundamentalist Christians as evolution and “secular
humanism” to less familiar themes such as “futuristic supernaturalism,”
pacifism, magic and false views of death.
In her lengthy testimony Mrs. Frost identified passages from stories
and poems used in the Holt series that fell into each category. Illustrative
is her first category, futuristic supernaturalism, which she defined as
teaching “Man As God.” Passages that she found offensive described
Leonardo da Vinci as the human with a creative mind that “came closest
to the divine touch.” Similarly, she felt that a passage entitled “Seeing
Beneath the Surface” related to an occult theme, by describing the use of
imagination as a vehicle for seeing things not discernible through our
physical eyes. She interpreted a poem, “Look at Anything,” as presenting
the idea that by using imagination a child can become part of anything
and thus understand it better. Mrs. Frost testified that it is an “occult
practice” for children to use imagination beyond the limitation of
scriptural authority.100
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Notably, the parents were not demanding a remedy of having the course readers
removed for all students and having the schools adopt course readers that aligned
with the dissenting parents’ faith.101 As Judge Lively and Judge Boggs noted in
their respective opinions, such a remedy would have run afoul of the Establishment
Clause.102 Rather, the parents demanded the option for their children to opt out of
class when the readers were being studied and to receive alternative instruction
from nonobjectionable readers.103 Indeed, this is the type of remedy that the district
court mentioned in ruling for the plaintiff-parents.104
The Sixth Circuit, however, ultimately disagreed with the plaintiff-parents,
and while all three judges on the panel converged on the same result, they had
some divergence in their preferred rationales.105 Lively, writing for the court,
argued that the mere exposure of the children to the ideas in the reader could not
constitute a burden on their religion since the children were not asked to agree with
or otherwise affirm their belief in the ideas purported to be in the reader:
The requirement that students read the assigned materials and attend
reading classes, in the absence of a showing that this participation
entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief, or performance or
non-performance of a religious exercise or practice, does not place an
unconstitutional burden on the students’ free exercise of religion.106
Given this, and given the crucial role of the school in exposing these children—and
all children—to norms of toleration for others’ religious beliefs,107 Lively
concluded that the plaintiff-parents lost on their claim, and thus were not entitled to
the benefit of an opt-out for their children.108
Judge Kennedy concurred in the ruling and took an even stronger position in
defense of the school district.109 Kennedy agreed that there was no religious burden
being imposed on the dissenting parents and their children here.110 Still, she went
on to argue that even if there were a religious burden in this case, the state should
still win given that it had compelling interests at stake: its interests in teaching the
children critical thinking and civility, and avoiding religious divisiveness.111
Kennedy thus offered the strongest opinion among the three judges on the role of
the public schools in facilitating cohesion across religious difference. Finally,
101
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Judge Boggs concurred in the result, but reached this conclusion through quite a
different route compared to the other two judges.112 He thought that there was a
kind of religious “burden” imposed on the dissenting parents and their children,
and that the exposure of these children to certain ideas was not insignificant but
instead the imposition of a genuine cost to them:
The plaintiffs provided voluminous testimony of the conflict (in their
view) between reading the Holt readers and their religious beliefs,
including extensive Scriptural references. The district court found that
“plaintiffs’ religious beliefs compel them to refrain from exposure to the
Holt series.” I would think it could hardly be clearer that they believe
their religion commands, not merely suggests, their course of action.113
That said, he also thought that the burden suffered by the plaintiffs did not
constitute a constitutional burden.114 Boggs instead ruled for the school district
based upon his strong presumption of judicial deference to local school boards on
such decisions of curriculum; ultimately, this was an argument based on
democratic and local grounds. As he stated:
It is a substantial imposition on the schools to require them to justify
each instance of not dealing with students’ individual, religiously
compelled, objections (as opposed to permitting a local, rough and ready,
adjustment), and I do not see that the Supreme Court has authorized us to
make such a requirement.115
D. Religion/Ideology and Public Schools: Limits
All three of the Sixth Circuit judges involved in Mozert, in their own ways,
nodded to or offered their approval of public schools serving a cohesive function in
the face of religious/ideological plurality.116 Boggs’ opinion offered the least
support for this view, but even he, in the end, ruled in favor of Hawkins County
and in favor of the authority of local communities to shape their public school
curricula as they saw fit.117 If he was not as sympathetic as Kennedy to the notion
of a compelling state interest in teaching children critical thinking, he was
112
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sympathetic to the choice of Hawkins County to emphasize critical thinking in its
curriculum.
Yet, consider two significant limitations upon the authority of the state to
build religiously pluralistic communities in public schools, as recognized in the
doctrine. The first lies at the heart of the plaintiff-parents’ claims in Mozert: the
religious free exercise of students and their parents.118 Though the plaintiff-parents
were ultimately unsuccessful in Mozert, such claims were present in another major
religious freedom case where a group of dissenting parents of school children
found elements of the state’s vision of public education to be in conflict with their
beliefs.119 In contrast to the parents in Mozert, however, these parents actually
prevailed on their claims, and individual religious freedom ultimately trumped the
demands of the state.120
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,121 the Supreme Court confronted a group of dissenting
parents making a free exercise claim against Wisconsin’s mandatory school
attendance law, which required children to attend private or public school until the
age of sixteen.122 These parents were Amish and had declined to have their
children attend public school after the eighth grade.123 They claimed that the
exposure of their children to public school after the eighth grade threatened their
salvation, their good standing in the religious community, the salvation of their
children, and, ultimately, threatened the survival of their religious community.124
The Court sided with the parents, emphasizing in part the distinctiveness of
the Amish community:
The record shows that the respondents’ religious beliefs and attitude
toward life, family, and home have remained constant—perhaps some
would say static—in a period of unparalleled progress in human
knowledge generally and great changes in education. The respondents
freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith, that their religious
beliefs and what we would today call “life style” have not altered in
fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in a church-oriented
community, separated from the outside world and “worldly” influences,
their attachment to nature and the soil, is a way inherently simple and
uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against the pressure to
conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and
television, their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do
118
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indeed set them apart from much of contemporary society; these customs
are both symbolic and practical.125
Indeed, the distinctiveness of the Amish community was a point made by Lively in
distinguishing the parents in the Mozert case from the parents involved in Yoder.126
Very closely related to the preceding point, a second doctrinal limitation to
the judicial sympathy for community-building in schools in the
religious/ideological context has been the doctrine’s very established protection of
certain parental rights to control the education of their children—including the
preservation of a private school option.127 The Court’s allowance for private
schools thus permits an opt-out for those parents dissatisfied with public school
institutions, and who possess the means to pay private school tuition. Pierce v.
Society of the Sisters128 was the pivotal case in this regard, where the Court struck
down an Oregon state law that sought to ban private school instruction for children
between the ages of eight and sixteen (i.e., it required their attendance in public
schools).129 Two years earlier, in Meyer v. Nebraska,130 the Court likewise struck
down a Nebraska state law that sought to prohibit foreign language instruction
prior to the eighth grade, in any private or public school.131
These two cases stand out in the development of substantive due process and
as strong statements of judicial sympathy for parental authority over the education
of their children—a theme also discussed in Yoder.132 But the upshot of these cases
for our purposes is that they indicate clear limits upon a judicial vision
emphasizing the adhesive force of public education; in essence, the preservation of
a private school option allows children and their parents the potential to opt out of
the plurality and values being inculcated in elementary and secondary public
schools. Elements of these parental rights norms also underlie, to some extent, the
Court’s Establishment Clause cases dealing with the constitutionally permissible
limits of state aid to religious schools.133 And in more recent years, these same
norms have been implicated in the legal debates over school choice and
homeschooling options.134
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In sum, though the specific doctrinal limits may be different in the racial and
religious/ideological contexts, a basic similarity emerges in the Court’s approach
to both forms of plurality in public schools: a recognition of the beneficial
cohesive function served by public schools in cultivating elements of a common
culture, and a recognition of certain limits upon this cohesive function.135
III. CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Pivotal cases I cite in the preceding Part—such as Brown, Milliken, Grutter,
Gobitis, Barnette, Yoder, and Mozert—each command outsized attention within
their respective doctrinal areas. Part of the significance of these cases stems from
the specific rulings reached by their respective Courts. Relatedly, their significance
also stems from the broader social and legal problems presented within these cases
as well. With Brown and Milliken, for example, we have the two notable bookends
to the Court’s mid-twentieth century effort to desegregate elementary and
secondary public schools. In Grutter, we have the Court’s most recent, definitive
statement on higher educational race-based affirmative action, which is perhaps the
most visible, remaining controversy left over from the civil rights era.136 And in
Gobitis, Barnette, Yoder, and Mozert we have a set of cases—spanning decades—
that illustrate the multifaceted tension between individual religious freedom and
the authority of the state in structuring public education.
That these different issues—school desegregation, affirmative action,
religious freedom—have figured so prominently in the respective doctrinal areas of
race and religion/ideology in public education points to a notable divergence in the
very manner in which the judiciary has conceptualized political community in
these two contexts. Specifically, the fact that school integration and affirmative
action have been so central to the race and public education context suggests that
the problems of political community-creation have been central to the judicial
considerations and arguments there. Hence, there is a judicial focus in those cases
135
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on the scope and limits of state power in creating new racially integrated public
school communities through aggressive desegregation remedies at the elementary
and secondary level, or through race-based affirmative action at the higher
education level.
In contrast, the controversies over state authority to control student behavior,
control the curriculum, and compel attendance in public schools in the face of
religious/ideological plurality suggests a relatively greater judicial preoccupation
with political community-maintenance in those cases. That is, unlike the racial
context, there is a built-in judicial presumption of religious/ideological plurality
existing in public schools.137 As the judges have conceptualized it, the problem
confronting those who wish to build political community across
religious/ideological lines in public schools is not how to bring about pluralistic
communities, but how best to manage an already existing plurality—or how best to
maintain political community.
In the sections below, I will proceed by fleshing out the relatively greater
judicial focus on creation in the racial context, and maintenance in the
religious/ideological context. Similar to Part II, the discussion of these doctrinal
areas will not be comprehensive, but will instead focus on those cases that have
figured prominently in questions of racial or religious/ideological plurality in
public schools. The test of whether or not my case selection is representative of the
various, primary concerns in these doctrinal areas will, as in Part II, rest upon the
plausibility of my claims.
Yet, unlike the upshot of Part II where I highlighted similarities in the judicial
arguments on racial and religious/ideological plurality in public schools, this Part
will be focused on the above noted divergence. Specifically, I will aim to
illuminate this distinction between a judicial focus on creation in the racial context
and maintenance in the religious/ideological context by elaborating upon the
various concerns articulated by proponents of community-building (who I will
refer to as “community-advocates”) and those more skeptical of communitybuilding actions by the state (who I will refer to as “skeptics”) in each body of
doctrine.138 Illuminating these concerns in more detail will underscore the
137

See George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
871–73 (1988).
138
I should mention two notes about my choice of terminology here. First, I use the
term “community-advocates” instead of “communitarianism,” simply because the latter has
too much conceptual baggage from debates in political theory, some of which are not
relevant to my concerns here. For a brief and concise summary of the various claims of
communitarian political theorists, see WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 199–237 (2002). Second, my labels of “communityadvocate” and “skeptic” are intended only to mark out distinct positions on specific issues.
Thus, when I label Justice Jackson’s opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education vs.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) as a “skeptical” argument on community below, this is not
to imply an evaluation of Jackson’s larger philosophy on political community. It is merely
to indicate that on the particular issue of the mandatory flag salute, at issue in that case,
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divergent background presumptions behind them—namely, that in the racial
context, a pluralistic community is not presumed in our public schools, while in the
religious/ideological context, such a community is presumed.
A. Race and Community-Creation in Public Schools
Among those judges and scholars who have favored facilitating more racially
diverse communities in public schools, one persistent concern has been the
pernicious effect of enduring racial isolation and segmentation in the absence of
aggressive desegregation remedies at the elementary and secondary level, or
affirmative action at the higher education level. The judicial posture among those
seeking to facilitate racial plurality is one of community-creation, because absent
judicial approval of the state actions involved—desegregation measures or higher
education affirmative action—the background presumption is that there would be
minimal racial plurality occurring in public educational institutions.
Consider in this regard some of the dissents in the Milliken opinion. In
evaluating the majority’s disapproval of the city-suburban desegregation remedy,
Justice Douglas stated the following on the background condition of residential
segregation in Detroit:
The inner core of Detroit is now rather solidly black; and the blacks,
we know, in many instances are likely to be poorer, just as were the
Chicanos in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez. By that decision
the poorer school districts must pay their own way. It is therefore a
foregone conclusion that we have now given the States a formula
whereby the poor must pay their own way. 139
Similarly, Justice Marshall stated the following:
Under a Detroit-only decree, Detroit’s schools will clearly remain
racially identifiable in comparison with neighboring schools in the
metropolitan community. Schools with 65% and more Negro students
will stand in sharp and obvious contrast to schools in neighboring
districts with less than 2% Negro enrollment. Negro students will
continue to perceive their schools as segregated educational facilities and

Justice Jackson’s opinion relative to Justice Frankfurter’s was the position more skeptical
of or relatively less concerned with, facilitating community-building in public schools.
139
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 759–60 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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this perception will only be increased when whites react to a Detroit-only
decree by fleeing to the suburbs to avoid integration.140
There is no mistaking the background presumption—at least among these
dissenting Justices—that the default status quo condition in Detroit is one of
minimal racial plurality in these public schools. And in the post-Brown era, the
absence of greater integration in public schools underscores the strong suspicion
that the default societal condition—absent integrationist measures by the state
during and since the civil rights era—would be one of even more limited racial
plurality.141
Similarly, in the higher educational context, proponents of affirmative action
argue that such measures are crucial in aiding racial plurality.142 Some evidence
does suggest significant costs to racial plurality without affirmative action
measures in place.143 Certainly in the context of law schools, advocates and critics
of affirmative action both largely concede the importance of affirmative action in
aiding the racial diversity of selective law schools.144 Thus, the prevailing
background assumption of limited racial plurality—absent the state actions under
discussion in the desegregation and affirmative action cases—is what places the
judiciary in a posture of either creating or not creating racially pluralistic
communities in these cases.
Community-advocates have put forth the preceding arguments, but similar
background presumptions are apparent in the arguments of community-skeptics as
well.145 The latter likewise proceed from a shared understanding with their
opponents that the judicial role in these cases is one of either creating or not
140

Id. at 804. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at 814–15. For
a more recent reference to these themes, see Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 838–43 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141
See Gary Orfield et al., The Resurgence of School Segregation, 60 EDUCATIONAL
LEADERSHIP 16, 18–19 (2002).
142
See, e.g., Orfield et al., supra note 141, at 19–20 (explaining the relationship
between racial and poverty composition of schools and test scores).
143
THOMAS J. EPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER
SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND
CAMPUS LIFE 346–48 (2009).
144
Richard Sander, a critic of affirmative action, states, “[t]he most obvious
disadvantage of [law schools ending their use of racial preferences] is that the most elite
law schools would have very few black students—probably in the range of 1% to 2% of
overall student bodies.” Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in
American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 483 (2004). Not surprisingly, David L.
Chambers, Timothy T. Clydesdale, William C. Kidder, and Richard O. Lempert and other
supporters of affirmative action reach the same conclusions even more emphatically. David
L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law
Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1891–
97 (2005).
145
KYMLICKA, supra note 138, at 199–237.
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creating racially pluralistic communities.146 And the best evidence of this shared
understanding lies in the categorical nature of the critiques by skeptics.147 Hence
for those more skeptical of community-building in the race and public educational
context, the primary argument has, for the most part, not been a debate over better
or worse ways for the state to balance the goal of state promotion of racially
pluralistic schools versus other state goals—a question that goes to community
management.148 Rather, the perspective of many skeptics has been more oriented to
questioning the very legitimacy of a state interest in promoting racial plurality in
public schools at all.149
Admittedly, this argumentative posture could imply one of two possible
positions by skeptics, depending upon their presumptions of default conditions in
public schools: (a) the skeptical position may be that since there is already
sufficient racial plurality in America’s public schools as a default matter, the
146

Id.
Id.
148
There are three notable exceptions, however, where members of the Court
articulated reservations regarding affirmative action that were not categorical. These
critiques were thus articulated alongside defenses of affirmative action: Powell’s opinion
for the Court in Regents of University of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265, 305–24 (1978)
(striking down the U.C. Davis Medical School affirmative action program, while upholding
the use of race as “plus” factor in higher education admissions); O’Connor’s opinion for
the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334–37 (2003) (following Powell’s
opinion in Bakke in upholding a limited use of race in higher education admissions); and
Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (recognizing a qualified interest of local authorities to promote
integration in public schools). As Kennedy stated:
147

This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment
to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its
children. A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that
a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise,
a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student
population. Race may be one component of that diversity, but other
demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.
What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not
made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of
them to schools based on that classification. Crude measures of this sort threaten
to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one school’s
supply and another’s demand.
Id. at 797–98. It is telling that each of these opinions constituted, in a sense, the sentiments
of the swing vote on each of these very sharply divided courts. This suggests that such
middle-ground reservations have hardly been the norm over the course of the Supreme
Court’s race and public education jurisprudence.
149
KYMLICKA, supra note 138, at 199–237.
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state’s nonintervention in this context would not undermine the existence of
racially pluralistic schools; or (b) the skeptical position may be that since robust,
racially pluralistic public schools will largely not exist absent state intervention,
and since the state interest in actively promoting racially pluralistic schools is
illegitimate, the existence of racially pluralistic schools should be sacrificed for
other state interests. Given the stark demographic realities discussed in the
preceding cases, however, and given that the skeptical judicial opinions in these
cases are hardly dependent upon strong claims of a robust, default racial plurality
existing in public schools absent state intervention, I tend to think the second
argument better describes the position contained in some of the key skeptical
judicial opinions on desegregation and affirmative action. As such, when these
opinions critique state interventions in the form of desegregation remedies or
higher education affirmative action, they ultimately question in a more categorical
way whether the judiciary should even allow for racially pluralistic communities in
these schools or not. In other words, these skeptical arguments question the
judiciary’s role in community-creation.
Consider then some arguments that question the legitimacy of state actions to
promote racial plurality in public schools. For example, there is the often-made
critique of community-skeptics that race-conscious, or “benign,” state actions are
inherently harmful to broader society in segmenting individuals by race—an
argument I noted above in Part II.150 Approaching race-conscious remedies at the
elementary and secondary or higher educational levels with such a presumption
implies a view of state actions as highly problematic and irregular acts of state
engineering. The presence of so little concession to the state’s goal of cultivating
cohesive pluralistic communities in these arguments conveys the significance these
skeptics attribute to the Court’s rulings in these matters. Further, it suggests a
belief that the costs of such social engineering are so great that dramatic acts of
community-building, such as desegregation measures and affirmative action,
should generally not be undertaken (or, at least, not unless there has been a prior
state action of discrimination).
Beyond these potential concerns of race segmentation, other skeptics have
noted different costs flowing from state actions aimed at community-building
across race.151 At the elementary and secondary level, white parents of school
children critiqued federal judicially-mandated desegregation measures—such as
bussing—decades ago with concerns about their children being forced to attend
inferior schools.152 Such concerns have carried over to the present day, where the
prospect of an active state role in creating greater racial plurality in the public
150

See supra Part II.
See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L. J. 249, 256–57
(1999) (indicating that racially isolate schools that are primarily composed of minority
student are costlier to run because poor students typically have greater needs).
152
MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS IN THE
SUNBELT SOUTH 9 (2006).
151

570

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

schools through measures such as bussing is politically implausible.153 Hence
James Ryan stated in 1999 that:
It seems unfashionable these days, if not atavistic, to talk seriously about
ways to increase racial integration. To be sure, one still encounters
attempts to spark conversations about improving race relations and
promoting integration, but a strong sense of fatigue seems to accompany
such attempts.154
And at the higher education level, critics of affirmative action, such as Richard
Sander, have claimed that such programs “mismatch” affirmative action
beneficiaries with law schools that teach and have their students compete at levels
beyond the ability of these beneficiaries.155 He argues that this ultimately imposes
costs to affirmative action beneficiaries with respect to bar exam passage and/or
with respect to the job market.156 Justice Thomas has also given voice to this
critique, stating in his Grutter dissent:
The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers.
These overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot
succeed in the cauldron of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not
restricted to elite institutions. Indeed, to cover the tracks of the
aestheticists, this cruel farce of racial discrimination must continue—in
selection for the Michigan Law Review, and in hiring at law firms and
153

Ryan, supra note 151, at 257; See also Dale Russakoff, Schooled, THE NEW
YORKER (May 19, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/schooled
[https://perma.cc/8HLE-NZHN] (providing an in-depth examination of the various reform
strategies that public school reformers have recently tried in Newark, none of which
involved bussing with surrounding suburbs of course).
154
Ryan, supra note 151, at 251. Hence, Ryan focuses on different forms of school
choice as a more plausible path toward encouraging greater racial diversity in schools. Id.
at 310–15.
155
Sander supra note 144, at 449–50, 452.
156
Id. at 440–42, 445–54, 466–68, 474–75, 478–80. Sander’s argument has garnered
extensive criticism, both with respect to his methodology and with respect to his larger
substantive claims. See Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the
Number of Black Lawyers, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1808–10 (2005); Chambers et al., supra
note 144, at 1856–57; Daniel E. Ho, Why Affirmative Action Does Not Cause Black
Students to Fail the Bar, 114 YALE L.J. 1997, 1997–98 (2005); see also WILLIAM G.
BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 275–90 (1998) (offering a
broad data-driven defense of affirmative action); Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s
Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 395, 494–504 (2000) (offering another broad data-driven defense of affirmative
action).
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for judicial clerkships—until the “beneficiaries” are no longer tolerated.
While these students may graduate with law degrees, there is no evidence
that they have received a qualitatively better legal education (or become
better lawyers) than if they had gone to a less “elite” law school for
which they were better prepared. And the aestheticists will never address
the real problems facing “underrepresented minorities,” instead
continuing their social experiments on other people’s children.157
In sum then, the concerns raised by critics of race-conscious community-building
measures speak less to the question of how state actions to aid racial plurality can
be accommodated with competing concerns and more to the question of whether
public educational communities constituted by race consciousness should exist at
all. These concerns by skeptics—combined with a background condition likely
apparent to skeptics that significant racial plurality in public schools relies upon
integrationist actions by the state158—underscores that the dominant legal question
here is one of community-creation. That is, should the state create or not create
these racially diverse communities? By way of further fleshing out this point, let
me now turn to the religious/ideological doctrinal context, so we might compare
and contrast the various concerns articulated there with those that we have just
surveyed in the context of race.
B. Religion/Ideology and Maintenance in Public Schools
The problems of political community-building in the religious/ideological
context are conspicuously different from the problems discussed in the racial
context in at least one key respect: in the former context, the central concerns take
place against a background assumption of religious plurality existing in public
schools. Distinct from the worries of segmentation and isolation the dissenting
Justices voiced in Milliken,159 judges and scholars who focus on
religious/ideological plurality take as their starting point—and take as their
primary problem in some ways—the inescapable fact of religious plurality.160 The
reasons for the existence of such plurality in public schools stems from at least
three interrelated conditions: compulsory school attendance laws,161 a locality157

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
158
Orfield et al., supra note 141, at 17–19.
159
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 764 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
160
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940) overruled by W. Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
161
Hence, not surprisingly, compulsory school attendance laws are the starting point
for many of the controversies underlying the pivotal cases in the religious/ideological
context. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–08 (1972); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629, 629 n.5, 632 (1943); Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 592; Mozert v.
Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987).
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centric system of public school attendance in America,162 and a relatively less
geographic segmentation by religion, compared to race, in American society. This
is not to say that certain religions do not predominate in certain localities or that
private religious schools are not, and have not been, significant alternatives to
public schools. But, however much such conditions may subtract from a default
presence of religious plurality in public schools, it seems safe to say that a fear of
religious segmentation in public schools has not preoccupied the courts in the same
manner that fears of racial segmentation have in the past.
Given that a presumption of plurality underlies the various arguments of
community-advocates and skeptics in the realm of religion/ideology and public
schools, this informs a second divergence between religion/ideology and race. If
the primary point of contestation in the racial context was whether the judiciary
should allow for the creation of racially pluralistic school communities, the
primary question in the religious/ideological context is (for the most part) how best
to manage an already present religious/ideological plurality in public schools.
Consider first the various arguments of the community-advocates. I discuss a
rather diverse set of these arguments below, and what ties them all together is a
relatively similar concern as to how the state may best occupy the middle ground
in the face of religious plurality. That is, with regard to the state’s actions—
manifested in a local school board’s actions and/or the actions of the federal
judiciary—how can the state best cultivate a common middle ground between its
goals and the inevitable objections from individuals, without imposing illegitimate
burdens on individuals? This fundamentally speaks to a concern regarding
community management.
For example, in his opinion for the Court in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis, Justice Frankfurter offered a defense of the Minersville school board’s
requirement of a flag salute by teachers and students in the face of religious
objection from students who were Jehovah’s Witnesses.163 Frankfurter viewed the
mandatory flag salute as an acceptable middle ground between the competing
demands of community and respecting religious freedom. On the one hand, core
rights of the Gobitis children such as their (internal) freedom of conscience,
speech, and assembly were not endangered by the mandatory flag salute.164 At the
same time, even though much of his opinion was framed as an act of judicial
deference to state legislative authority, Frankfurter gave voice to the benefits of the
mandatory flag salute in its cultivation of national, and by implication local, unity.
As he stated: “The influences which help toward a common feeling for the
common country are manifold. Some may seem harsh and others no doubt are
foolish. Surely, however, the end is legitimate.”165
162

See Miliken, 418 U.S. at 741–43.
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591–92 (1940), overruled by W.
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
164
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600.
165
Id. at 598; see also id. at 595–600.
163
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A second example of community-advocacy along the same lines is Judge
Lively’s opinion from Mozert. The structure of his argument regarding the
Hawkins County school board’s choice of curriculum follows in broad strokes the
Frankfurter approach to the mandatory flag salute. According to Lively, the
required textbook did not unduly infringe upon the objecting students and their
parents because it amounted to mere exposure and did not encompass any
governmental compulsion of the children to engage in conduct contrary to their
beliefs.166 At the same time, the mandatory readers would serve a communityenhancing function by teaching critical thinking to all school children and
providing them with a common ground to engage with one another
notwithstanding their difference in religious background.167 The teaching of critical
thinking would serve as a crucial means of managing religious plurality.
The “tolerance of divergent . . . religious views” referred to by the
Supreme Court is a civil tolerance, not a religious one.168 It does not
require a person to accept any other religion as the equal of the one to
which that person adheres. It merely requires recognition that in a
pluralistic society we must “live and let live.”169
To be sure, the precise mode of managing religious plurality endorsed by
Lively was distinct from Frankfurter’s defense of the mandatory flag salute.
Indeed, Lively’s emphasis on the distinction between state-mandated exposure to
ideas (which he deemed acceptable) and state-mandated conduct like a flag salute
(which he deemed unacceptable) figured prominently in his opinion.170 Hence he
explicitly registered his disagreement with Frankfurter’s opinion in Gobitis.171 But
again, a common and primary emphasis on cultivating community in public
schools joins both opinions, and both opinions deploy a set of arguments defending
state actions as acceptable means of managing plurality to enhance community.
Finally, similar arguments are prominent within the scholarly literature as
well. Stephen Macedo, for example, sets forth a theory of “civic liberalism” that he
elaborates upon primarily in the context of public schools and religious plurality
(Mozert, for example, factors into his analysis more than any other legal case).172
As with most of the other judges and scholars mentioned in this section, Macedo
begins with the assumption that deep religious/ideological plurality is
inescapable.173 Hence, the state should tolerate and accept this fact.174 This is
166

Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1064–66, 1069, 1070 (6th
Cir. 1987).
167
Id. at 1060.
168
Id. at 1069 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
169
Id.; see also id. at 1068–70.
170
Id. at 1069–70.
171
Id. at 1066.
172
MACEDO, supra note 20, at 181–89.
173
Id. at 40–50.
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Macedo’s concession to the religious freedom and autonomy of individuals.175
However, building upon John Rawls’s theory of “political liberalism,”176 Macedo
argues that when it comes to democratic governance, the state and its citizens can
demand that members of the polity converge upon the use of “public reasoning” as
an acceptable common ground for engagement.177
Such a norm implies standard liberal norms like reciprocity and toleration for
one’s fellow citizens.178 As such, “[c]ivic liberals must walk a tightrope,
emphasizing the great weight of shared political aims but, so far as possible,
avoiding taking sides on the wider religious dimensions of political matters and
allowing that reasonable citizens may disagree about their religious and some of
their basic philosophical views.”179 One can easily see how such an outlook would
align well with the Lively opinion in Mozert, and indeed, Macedo offered little
sympathy for the position staked out by the plaintiff-parents in that case:
As a matter of basic principle at least, we have good reason to refuse the
Mozert families’ request to opt out. If intransigence here appears to be at
odds with religious freedom, it must be remembered that rightful liberty
is civil liberty, or liberty that can be guaranteed equally to all. All of us
must accept limits on our liberty designed to sustain a system of equal
freedom for all. Each of us can reasonably be asked to surrender some
control over our own children for the sake reasonable common efforts to
ensure that all future citizens learn the minimal prerequisites of
citizenship. There is no right to be exempted from measures necessary to
secure the freedom of all.180
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Id. at 2.
Id.
176
RAWLS, supra note 17, at 4.
177
MACEDO, supra note 20, at 169 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 214
(1971)).
178
Id. at 169–72.
179
Id. at 175.
180
Id. at 202. For other community-advocacy arguments in the literature, see Amy
Gutman’s theory of democratic education. Amy Gutman, Undemocratic Education, in
LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 71, 75–81 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) [hereinafter
Gutman, Undemocratic Education]. Her theory leads her to be critical of the Mozert
parents. Id. at 81–85; Amy Gutman, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557,
572–73 (1995) [hereinafter Gutman, Civic Education]. Her theory is critical of the Yoder
parents as well. Id. at 570; see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:
Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 162–65, 170–72 (1995) (asserting that
schools should serve the goal of making children culturally literate and facilitate a common
civic-cultural identity among them). See generally GUTMANN, supra note 20 (arguing for a
democratic approach to education).
175
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Macedo’s argument thus speaks to a primary concern of managing diversity within
a community.
There are a number of arguments on the more skeptical side of these debates,
however, where judges and scholars have articulated their ambivalence about
various state actions undertaken toward community goals in public schools. As
seen in the cases and scholarly works discussed below, what underlies this
ambivalence are a range of competing rights and alternative concerns, most of
which center on religious freedom and parental authority in directing the education
of children. Yet, for the most part, such skeptical arguments in the
religious/ideological context converge with the community-advocacy arguments in
presuming a background condition of religious plurality, and in advocating for
state action (or nonaction) that encompasses a different way to manage that
plurality within the public school context.
In the case of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,181 Justice
Jackson wrote for the Court in striking down a mandatory flag salute by teachers
and students adopted by the West Virginia state board of education, and overruled
the Gobitis ruling.182 Parents of school children who were Jehovah’s Witnesses,
and who raised a religious objection, again brought the case.183 Notwithstanding
the potential benefits to national unity that may have underlay a mandatory flag
salute, Jackson viewed this mode of managing plurality as problematic for several
key reasons: it encompassed a coercion of the objecting students in violation of
their First Amendment free speech protections;184 no substantial costs were
imposed upon others if certain students engaged in peaceful noncompliance with
the flag salute;185 and ultimately, Jackson suggested that such an exercise would be
ineffective in cultivating civic and cultural unity.186 As he stated in elaborating on
the last point:
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife
becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper
division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from
finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public
educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing.187

181

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 626–29, 642.
183
Id. at 629.
184
Id. at 631–37; see also id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring); Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 601–02, 605–07 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) overruled by
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
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Id. at 640–42; see also id. at 644 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 646
(Murphy, J., concurring).
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Id. at 641.
182

576

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

However, it is worth emphasizing the concessions to the authority of the state,
also articulated by Jackson, in shaping a cultural unity out of the religious plurality
in public schools. Jackson stated “the State may ‘require teaching by instruction
and study of all in our history and in the structure and organization of our
government, including the guaranties of civil liberty, which tend to inspire
patriotism and love of country.’”188 And later in the opinion, he noted that
“[n]ational unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is
not in question.”189 Thus, much as Frankfurter sought to draw an acceptable line
between religious autonomy and the demands of the state, the same goal is
apparent in Jackson’s opinion. While the two simply differ on the legitimacy of the
mandatory flag salute itself, they do converge upon the goal of seeking to manage
religious plurality between these competing interests of individual autonomy and
preserving community.
Similarly, the orientation toward managing, as opposed to creating, religious
plurality in public schools can be gleaned in the argument of Judge Boggs in
Mozert. Boggs was the most skeptical among the three Sixth Circuit judges about
the Hawkins County school board’s actions.190 He was also the most sympathetic
to the plaintiff-parents among the three judges, even though he ultimately
concurred in the ruling.191 But Boggs forcefully articulated the limited scope of
what the parents were demanding: it was not the requirement of new books in the
curriculum, but a relatively modest opt-out for their children.192 This requested
accommodation encompassed clear concessions to state authority to otherwise
structure its public schools. At stake in this disagreement between the plaintiffparents and the Hawkins County school board then was mere disagreement over
better or worse ways to manage the claims of religious difference raised by the
former. Perhaps with some of these points in mind, the plaintiff-parents did garner
a degree of sympathy in the scholarly literature, with several authors emphasizing
the relative modesty and defensibility of an opt-out provision relative to the
position of the school board in that case.193
188

Id. at 631 (quoting Gobitis 310 U.S. at 604 (Stone, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 640.
190
Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1073 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Boggs, J., concurring).
191
Id. at 1073–74.
192
Id. at 1074–75.
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BATES, supra note 100, at 268–302; Shelley Burtt, Religious Parents, Secular
Schools: A Liberal Defense of an Illiberal Education, 56 REV. OF POL. 51, 53, 57–58, 65–
66, (1994); Dent, supra note 137, at 923–27. Though it preceded the Mozert opinion by
about ten years, Hirschoff would likely have been sympathetic to the plaintiff parents too:
189

Although the state has legitimate interests in preparing youth for citizenship, for
a vocation, and for a satisfactory personal life, the potential for indoctrination of
children in the public schools in values which conflict with those of their parents
necessitates limitations on the power of the state to require instruction. Such
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A similar observation may be made in the Yoder case. Even though the
objecting Amish parents prevailed in their desire to withdraw their children from
public schools, Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court (and the claims of the Amish
parents as well) proceeded from assumptions of community-management.194 This
may be gleaned from a notable concession to state authority articulated in the
Court’s opinion: the Amish parents did not contest the authority of the state in
compelling school attendance until completion of the eighth grade and the Court
ruling itself referred to the continuing force of this school attendance
requirement.195
The Court offered this more general statement of the state’s authority,
notwithstanding its ruling in this case:
Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applicability of the
State’s compulsory school-attendance statutes or to limit the power of the
State to promulgate reasonable standards that, while not impairing the
free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational
education under parental and church guidance by the Old Order Amish
or others similarly situated.196
In short, even though Yoder contemplated a dramatic accommodation of
religious freedom by allowing for the departure of Amish children from the public
school community, this was still a ruling that both placed constraints on the scope
of religious liberty—the Amish children were not given free license to withdraw
from all school requirements—and that recognized a continuing state interest in
fashioning community in public schools.197 The orientation of the Court here was
one of managing the problems of religious plurality posed by the claims of the
Amish parents.
Finally, consider a set of skeptical arguments, distinguished from the
preceding arguments only in their even greater skepticism of the unifying function
of public schools and in their greater concession to other values such as parental
potential indoctrination conflicts with the first amendment’s protection of
freedom of speech, its implicit protection of freedom of thought and the
“marketplace of ideas,” and the general principle that our government is a
government by consent of the governed. To avoid possible indoctrinative
effects, parents must have a constitutionally protected right to excuse their
children from instruction which conflicts with their parents’ values.
Mary-Michelle Upson Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a
Right to Have One’s Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
871, 957 (1977).
194
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
195
Id. at 207, 212.
196
Id. at 236.
197
See id. at 221.
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autonomy or diversity. In certain respects, these arguments track familiar themes
that we have seen elsewhere in the religious/ideological context. Common within
these arguments is a starting presumption of deep religious or ideological plurality
that is understood to inevitably intersect with public schools. Hence the motivating
question remains—as was the case with the community-advocacy and skeptical
arguments noted above—on how best to manage plurality.
Yet, as a point of divergence, these—for lack of a better term—“heightenedskeptics” of community-building in public schools see the most fruitful avenues of
management to not lie within greater accommodation of religious freedom within
the public schools.198 Rather, their focus is on schemes that contemplate
government-subsidized school choice among public, charter, and/or private school
options.199 Hence if these heightened-skeptics are still focused on themes of
managing plurality, their version of management is across the range of educational
options and not simply within the public schools.
For example, Rosemary Salomone focuses on the problems of plurality that
are prompted by the concerns of religious conservatives.200 She ultimately
proposes a three-part framework for elementary and secondary education that is
more accommodating of religious and ideological plurality than the present
system:
The proposed model would include a mix of three formats of
government-supported schools operating under state education statutes:
publicly funded and controlled public schools in their current form under
the auspices of local school boards, some or all of which may introduce
family choice strategies within the geographical bounds of a stateestablished school district; public charter schools funded directly by
government and managed by outside groups under the sponsorship of a
legislatively designated governmental entity; and private choice schools,
including religiously affiliated institutions, funded through voucher
payments provided by the state to parents who demonstrate economic
need.201
To be sure, Salomone gives some weight to the state’s interest in forging societal
unity—hence the presence of public schools in her three-part scheme. Her scheme
also encompasses state authority and oversight over the entire proposed system,
recognizing that “[e]ven private choice schools partially funded through
government tuition subsidies to parents would be prohibited from teaching or
acting in any way that undermines the nation’s overarching commitment to racial
198

See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE,
COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCATION 5–8 (2000).
199
See id.
200
Id. at 6.
201
Id. at 256.
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equality or political commitment to gender equality (within the reasonable bounds
of religious beliefs), [and] to religious tolerance.”202 But the primary thrust of her
proposal is her assertion that plurality may best be managed by allowing for the
separation of diverse constituencies.203 Her scheme would allow for community
cohesiveness, but in a segmented form and not just through public educational
institutions. She states that in her model “community is not necessarily defined by
residence but by a shared sense of purpose . . . [an] education built on a shared
worldview, provided [the coalesced family groups] adhere to core political
commitments, the value of civil toleration, and specified academic performance
standards.”204
In a similar vein, Michael McConnell has also endorsed a governmentsubsidized school choice scheme out of a similar concern for religious and
ideological plurality.205 Such a scheme would encompass a greater respect for the
religious and ideological values of parents than the status quo educational system,
though McConnell would also retain a role for state oversight.206 Perhaps even
more than Salomone, however, McConnell’s argument is motivated by a deeper
skepticism of the value of public schools in managing religious/ideological
plurality. As he states:

202

Id. at 257.
Id. at 7–8.
204
Id. at 264.
205
Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are
Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 87,
87–88 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) [hereinafter McConnell, Education
Disestablishment]. I should note, McConnell does also address racial plurality in a
tangential way in his arguments on education. For example, he speaks approvingly of the
possibility of Afrocentric charter or private schools as a component of his scheme for
segmenting elementary and secondary education. Michael W. McConnell,
Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice: What Does Our
Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 123, 125–28, 149–51 (1991)
[hereinafter McConnell, Multiculturalism]. Still, even when he incorporates racial plurality
into his argument, it is clear that his primary focus is on religious plurality. This is why I
situate his argument within the religious/ideological context.
206
McConnell, Education Disestablishment, supra note 205, at 87–88.
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Until relatively recently, the common schools were able to communicate
an effective brand of democratic values, but that was because they were
not squeamish about embracing a particular worldview—the Protestant.
It is unlikely that this can be replicated under modern conditions of
increased diversity in society and increased assertiveness by minority
groups. A modern public school faces two choices: either it adopts a
comprehensive doctrine and thus abandons its claims to being a liberal
institution, or it avoids comprehensive doctrines and abandons the hope
of supplying a morally coherent structure for its teaching of democratic
values.207
These arguments of heightened-skeptics share one thing in common with skeptical
arguments in the racial context: both seemingly question the value of plurality
within the public school.208 Yet, unlike community-skeptics in the racial context,
we very clearly see from Salomone and McConnell a sense that the task of
managing religious/ideological plurality is a crucial one for the state—hence, their
focus on schemes that would manage plurality by allowing different communities
to educate their children in a more segmented fashion.209
IV. PLURALITY WITHIN COMMUNITY
As is implied by the discussion in Part III, I view the main reason for the
greater judicial focus on community-creation in the race context and communitymaintenance in the religious/ideological context as stemming from default
conditions on population distribution. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
relatively greater geographic dispersion of different religious/ideological
constituencies within American society—compared to the dispersal of certain
racial minorities—have allowed for a default condition of relative plurality in
American public schools along religious/ideological lines that is not true for race.
Thus, I view the association of creation-race and maintenance-religion/ideology as
being not necessarily intrinsic to those dimensions of identity, but rather more
directly related to how those particular identities have tended to intersect with
geographic patterns in American life.210
207

Id. at 122.
SALOMONE, supra note 198, at 6; McConnell, Education Disestablishment, supra
note 205, at 126–28.
209
For another argument in a similar vein, see Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating
Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1024–25 (1996); see also
William A. Galston, Two Concepts of Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 524 (1995) (providing
Galston’s defense of the “diversity state,” which could be seen to align with the above
arguments on school choice, even though Galston does not address some of these
arguments directly).
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I do qualify the preceding statement by saying “not necessarily.” One might argue
that the relatively greater geographic segmentation along racial lines in American life,
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By way of illustrating this point, let us return to the example of Yale
University. In this particular incident, the focus of student activism and
administrative response was largely on matters of racial difference (with perhaps
some discussion of ideological plurality too). Yet the problem of plurality
confronting Yale is, I would submit, not a creation problem but a communitymaintenance problem—namely, how best to manage diverse claims of equality,
dignity, and respect within an already racially pluralistic university community.
Indeed in its profile for the class of 2019, Yale reported that “42.5% of freshmen
are US citizens or Permanent Residents from [racial/ethnic] minority groups” and
that 64% of students received some financial aid.211 This background condition of
relatively high racial plurality at Yale might be traced to its highly selective and
deliberate admissions process, and its policy of need-blind admissions212—both of

compared to religion, could suggest that there is indeed something intrinsic to those
identities driving geographic segmentation, and thus indirectly causing the
creation/maintenance distinction between racial and religious/ideological plurality in public
schools. While I am more confident in asserting the importance of geographic patterns in
causing the above noted distinction, I do not offer an answer on this latter question.
211
Yale College Class of 2020: Freshman Class Profile, YALE.EDU,
http://admissions.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/class_profile_2019_final.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/Z7JU-CB2B].
212
On “What Yale Looks For” in its admissions process, the Yale College admissions
website states:
We estimate that over three quarters of the students who apply for admission to
Yale are qualified to do the work here. Between two and three hundred students
in any year are so strong academically that their admission is scarcely ever in
doubt. But here is the thing to know: the great majority of students who are
admitted stand out from the rest because a lot of little things, when added up, tip
the scale in their favor. So what matters most in your application? Ultimately,
everything matters. The good news in that is that when so many little things
figure into an admissions decision, it is fruitless to worry too much about any
one of them.
...
We convene a committee of experienced admissions officers, Yale faculty, and
Yale deans to select applicants who have shown exceptional engagement,
ability, and promise.
Transcripts, test scores, essays, and recommendations help paint a picture not
only of a student’s accomplishments to date but also of the ways in which an
applicant has taken advantage of the opportunities available to him or her. For
example, does your school offer AP courses, an International Baccalaureate
program, neither, or both? We only expect you to take advantage of such
courses if your high school provides them.
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which have undoubtedly been crucial in allowing the university to construct a
community of students quite unlike the typical public school community.
The Yale example thus illustrates the potential for community-maintenance
themes to travel with problems of racial plurality as well as religious/ideological
plurality. (It may also indicate perhaps the extreme measures often needed to turn
problems of racial plurality into community-maintenance problems too.) But
beyond this, the Yale example is also useful in exploring my third and final
assertion in this Article: for community-builders, problems of maintenance are
generally preferable to problems of community-creation. This is not to say that
lines of division within a community may not, at times, be as deep or troubling as
lines of division that correspond to community-creation issues. Nor am I implicitly
suggesting that religious/ideological differences in America have uniformly been
less intense or problematic than racial differences.
Rather, the basis for my claim is merely that however deep the lines of
division may be within an already recognized or accepted community, one tool
may remain available for community-builders to bridge differences in that context
that will not be available in the community-creation context: the potential of a
common culture based upon experiences, reference points, places, individuals, and
events that can widely be viewed as common among all community members. This
common culture, as defined by these components is, in essence, a great part of
what was being referenced by the Yale Intercultural Affairs Committee, associate
master Erika Christakis, President Salovey, and the students who, angered by the
Christakis email, all invoked a desire for substantive communal engagement. And
this common culture provides all members of the community a means—in a sense
a language—to genuinely engage with one another.
Put in more concrete terms, grappling with the multitude of issues intertwined
with questions of racial inclusion and exclusion is obviously a tall order in any
context. But in the case of a university community like Yale, framing those
Again, we are looking for students who will make the most of Yale and the most
of their talents. Knowing how you’ve engaged in the resources and opportunities
at your high school gives us an expectation of how you might engage the
resources at Yale if admitted.
In selecting future Yale students, President Brewster wrote, “I am inclined to
believe that the person who gives every ounce to do something superbly has an
advantage over the person whose capacities may be great but who seems to have
no desire to stretch them to their limit.” Within the context of each applicant’s
life and circumstances, we look for that desire and ability to stretch one’s limits.
What Yale Looks For, YALE.EDU, http://admissions.yale.edu/what-yale-looks-for
[https://perma.cc/ZWG9-5ZV4]. On its financial aid policy, the website states: “Yale
admits students without regard to their ability to pay and meets 100% of demonstrated
financial need. For all students. Without loans.” Financial Aid At-A-Glance, YALE.EDU,
http://admissions.yale.edu/financial-aid [https://perma.cc/5CJW-U9Z4].
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concerns within the very grounded context of Halloween costumes, or the legacy
of racism in named campus buildings, provides an entry point for these incredibly
difficult questions where students can draw on common reference points, common
events, and common spaces. As the Yale debates themselves indicate, one
probably errs in thinking that there is anything like a universal student experience
at Yale or any other university campus. The dilemmas of plurality obviously do
not disappear within a community. Yet, if communities possess a strong enough
culture with sufficient engagement between diverse groups, the perception of at
least some points of commonality may facilitate communal cohesiveness—such as
some sense that on certain things, “just about every student at Yale knows ‘x,’ or is
aware of ‘y,’ or has seen ‘z,” or has had a particular reaction to something “wellknown” in their lives at Yale. The belief of certain points of commonality (the
substance of which will undoubtedly vary from student to student and will likely
change over time) allows for dialogue on plurality to begin and for claims to be
made and heard in a community. Thus, the culture within a community provides a
potential means of engaging with plurality that is absent where no community
exists on a particular point of disagreement.
In noting the potential of a common culture to serve as an adhesive for
plurality within a community, my claim both converges and diverges from a
related argument put forth by Jonathan Zimmerman. In his book, Whose America?,
Zimmerman examines the theme of racial and religious plurality in public schools
by focusing on debates over school curricula and textbooks over much of the
twentieth century.213 Among other things, Zimmerman concludes by noting that
the problems of religious plurality in this context have been somewhat more
vexing relative to race.214 The conflicts driven by racial plurality can—and have
been—mitigated by the repeated strategy of including more and more
representatives of each minority group into an overarching, unifying historical
narrative of American progress in history textbooks. In other words, a narrative of
American history and progress is possible that can subsume racial plurality. In
contrast, given the apparently more intractable nature of religious plurality in this
context—according to Zimmerman—no such strategy in history textbooks has
been available along the religious dimension.215 To quote Zimmerman on this
point:
Despite shrill warnings by a wide range of polemicists, the inclusion of
racial and ethnic minorities in textbooks did not dilute America’s
majestic national narrative. Instead, these fresh voices were folded into
the old story, echoing a century-long pattern of challenge, resistance, and
213

JONATHAN ZIMMERMAN, WHOSE AMERICA?: CULTURE WARS IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 2–8 (2002).
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Id. at 7–8.
215
Id. at 6–8, 214–22. I should note, however, that Zimmerman is himself critical of
this approach to teaching history. Id. at 224–25.
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co-option. On the religion front, compromise proved far more elusive.
Reflecting Americans’ essential beliefs about God and the universe,
religious principles simply could not be reconciled in an additive, comeone-come-all fashion. Conflicts over history textbooks generally
occurred within a shared set of assumptions about American civic
tradition. But religious disputes often lacked this common language, a
lack that accounts for their vehemence as well as their persistence.216
To the extent that Zimmerman’s argument may be instructive for problems of
American community-building more broadly, his conclusions only partially
converge with mine. Zimmerman is onto something in noting the strategy of
ameliorating conflict by expanding inclusivity with respect to racial questions in
history textbooks.217 By giving members of more racial groups a part in the
overarching historical narrative of American progress, racial conflicts over school
curricula can be situated within a common reference point (in a way that religious
conflicts have apparently not been situated). This aligns, I believe, with my claim
on the benefits of managing plurality within a community.
Yet Zimmerman’s argument does not speak to forms of unity that may be
rooted not in larger civic narratives, but in culture and common experiences. For
this reason, his argument perhaps overlooks the possibility of cultural adhesives to
bridge gaps across racial or religious differences—even if some of those
differences may be based on seemingly intractable points of belief. Thus, if the
problems of racial plurality look different at Yale because of the presence of a
university community and culture, it seems clear that the problems of
religious/ideological difference in many public schools have often looked different
than religious/ideological conflicts outside schools—for a similar reason. The
mechanisms for managing religious/ideological plurality in many public schools
have not been solely dependent upon the creation of unifying civic narratives.
Rather, at least one crucial adhesive mechanism has been the creation of a common
culture within the public school that binds diverse students together. A common
culture can manage plurality by softening the edges of disagreement, providing
alternative grounds for cohesion, providing a means of mutual respect and empathy
across major societal fault lines, or by providing a means for the major fault lines
to be put aside and ignored for other topics—such as parent-teacher-student
discussion of school dress codes, or the cost of extracurricular activities, or the
availability of certain advanced classes, or school pride in athletic teams.
If a common culture may indeed provide adhesive benefits to overcome
community-maintenance problems, this point takes us back to the key insight
discussed in Part II: that public schools provide a valuable function in bringing
diverse students together into close physical proximity. Yet, while the Court
focused on abstract values such as citizenship, toleration, building good character,
216
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or facilitating student exposure to diversity, one other benefit flows from this
interaction that, as we have seen, has been strongly implied by the Court: such
interaction facilitates the creation of shared experiences and common cultural
reference points for students from diverse backgrounds.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have examined some of the central cases on race and public
education, and religion/ideology and public education as a means of exploring
crucial themes of unity and plurality in the American political community. My
examination of these cases has led me to three claims: first, judicial conceptions of
community in these opinions demonstrate a belief that public schools can help
facilitate community across both racial and religious/ideological lines. Second,
these opinions also demonstrate a point of divergence: judicial arguments in the
racial context were more preoccupied with problems of community-creation, while
in the religious/ideological context, judicial arguments demonstrate a relatively
greater concern with community-maintenance. Finally, the problem of
maintenance is a relatively easier problem for community-builders because it
offers the possibility of a common culture serving as an adhesive across lines of
division within the community.
Thus, even if we cannot expect deep plurality to disappear from American
society, state actors who are concerned with bridging differences and finding
grounds for unity may want to consider some of these issues to be evolving rather
than persistent problems. That is, a problem of community-creation may—if a
community subsequently takes hold—eventually become a problem of communitymaintenance. Such an evolution should give community-builders cause for
optimism in certain contexts: if such a situation occurs, even inescapable problems
of plurality may become easier to manage within a community, relative to the
kinds of problems that may persist between communities.

